

Intergroup

from Jay Lorsch (ed.) HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1986

13

An intergroup perspective on group dynamics

CLAYTON P. ALDERFER

INTRODUCTION

The study of intergroup relations brings to bear a variety of methods and theories from social science on a diverse set of difficult social problems (Allport 1954; Merton 1960; Sherif and Sherif 1969; Van Den Berge 1972; Pettigrew 1981). Taken literally, intergroup relations refer to activities between and among groups. Note that the choice of preposition is significant. Whether people observe groups only two at a time or in more complex constellations has important implications for action and for understanding. Intergroup concepts can explain a broader range of phenomena than just what go on at the intersection of two or more groups. The range of concern is from how individuals think as revealed in studies of prejudice and stereotyping to how nation states deal with each other in the realm of international conflict. A central feature of virtually all intergroup analysis is the persistently problematic relationship between individual people and collective social processes.

The argument in this chapter proceeds in four major steps. The first section describes several prominent historical developments that set the stage for intergroup theory and method as we know it today. Included in this section are accounts of limitations in the early works as well as contributions. The second section explores several

dimensions along which contemporary versions of intergroup theory may be compared. The perspectives in this section pertain to concepts, methods, and social problems. The third section presents a version of intergroup theory. This particular formulation deals explicitly with organizations and provides answers to questions raised about early and contemporary formulations. The final section applies the particular theory to a variety of problems of practice and theory in organizational behavior. Here the aim is to show how application of intergroup theory leads to potentially different interpretations and actions than suggested by other writers. Throughout the paper, concepts from intergroup theory address statements and actions by individuals from a wide diversity of organizational roles, including researchers, politicians, teachers, managers, publicists, and consultants. The aim of the chapter is to explain and to explicate intergroup theory.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The roots of contemporary social scientific thinking about intergroup relations can be found in the period between the 1890s and the 1930s. This era contains the origins of theory, method, and technique that influence much of today's work. Here I identify four key developments: (1) Le Bon's (1895) theory of *the crowd*, (2) Sumner's (1906) concept of ethnocentrism, (3) Roethlis-

This research was sponsored by the Organizational Effectiveness Research Programs, Office of Naval Research (Code 442OE, Contract No. N00014-82-K-0715).

berger and Dickson's (1939) empirical work on management and the worker, and (4) the social invention of group treatment methods. Taken together the focus of attention ranges from the political behavior of nations, to the feelings and actions of clans and tribes, to the work activities of profit-making organizations, to the treatment of psychologically disturbed individuals.

Le Bon and *The Crowd*

Social scientists mark the beginning of intergroup studies with the publication of Gustave Le Bon's *The Crowd* in 1895 (Turner and Giles 1981). Le Bon used political events of nineteenth-century France as the basis for a series of propositions about individual and crowd behavior. Many of the issues and problems he addressed remain central to the study of intergroup relations today. These include

1. the effects of race in human affairs;
2. the substitution of unconscious action by groups for the conscious actions of individuals;
3. the impact of social scientists' group memberships on the views they espouse;
4. the stimulation of creativity and altruism in individuals by groups;
5. the tension between elites and masses;
6. the utility of group psychology for those who exercise leadership;
7. the manner in which groups shape the meaning of words and concepts for their members;
8. the role of leaders in groups; and
9. the variation in types of groups based on their composition and purpose.

These subjects were analyzed differently than they would be today. Le Bon was not a twentieth-century social scientist. Nevertheless the breadth of his vision was notable. Contemporary intergroup research is far more precise in both theory and data than Le Bon's pioneering effort. But the extent of intergroup phenomena to which he attended is rarely matched by current scholars. Le Bon's work was also important because it provided a stepping-off place for Sigmund Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1922), a small book that has been highly influential in many efforts to use knowledge about groups for the treatment of individual psychopathology. Yet there is a double paradox in this connection. Le Bon was rather unsure about whether his knowledge could or should be used to bring about change, and Freud did not conduct group treat-

ment, even though his analysis has been quite influential among those who do (Anthony 1971).

Sumner's concept of ethnocentrism

Just after the turn of the century, William Graham Sumner (1906) formulated the idea that intergroup relations in a state of conflict took on a predictable syndrome-like pattern, which he called "ethnocentrism." According to Sumner, ethnocentrism became the term to identify the "view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it. . . . Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders" (Sumner 1906, 13). Related to ethnocentrism were the concepts of in-group and out-group. The in-group is one's own group, and an out-group is any group with which one is in conflict.

Sumner's concepts have proved to be extraordinarily influential. Recently Levine and Campbell (1972) built an entire comparative theoretical analysis about theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes, and group behavior around the concept of ethnocentrism. Brewer and Campbell (1976) then conducted an extensive empirical study covering more than thirty groups to test hypotheses derived from comparing theories related to Sumner's propositions.

In both theoretical analysis and empirical study, Campbell and his associates demonstrate an awareness of the inability of investigators to escape being influenced by the phenomena they study. Examining Sumner's (1906; Sumner, Keller, and Davie 1927) literature searches, Levine and Campbell (1972, 19) note, "We must assume that the very great preponderance of the ethnographers available for Sumner to read were themselves unconsciously ethnocentric." Brewer and Campbell (1976, 125-26) describe a "triangulation" model for achieving what they term "objectivity" by having several observers describe several cultures. In employing this multigroup multiobserver model, Brewer and Campbell use a common interview format, which they themselves brought to the study. Thus, while they are able to see a version of researcher-group identification in reviewing Sumner's (1906) work, they seem unaware that their instrument, however carefully translated and used by different observers of diverse groups, is still *their* questionnaire. The issues they ask about are based on the theory of a white male Yale professor, vintage early-twentieth century (i.e., William Graham Sumner). How likely are the concepts embedded in the interview to be relevant, or, perhaps equally important, how likely

are they to be similarly relevant to all groups in an array of thirty tribes in eastern Africa in 1965? How likely were Brewer and Campbell, using the methodology that they did, to determine whether there were different degrees of relevance of their questions to the groups they studied?

The tradition of intergroup research set in motion by Sumner, even though subject to criticism for the ethnocentrism of its author and in spite of its conceptual power, has been one whereby investigators are *not* prodded to examine searchingly their own group identifications and their likely effect on research results.

Management and the worker

Roethlisberger and Dickson's (1939) work moves the arena of attention from national politics and tribal warfare to business organizations. There was no question about pragmatic motives. The Western Electric Company cooperated with researchers from the Harvard Business School because both organizations were concerned with determining the factors in the work place that influenced the morale and productive efficiency of workers. But their effort did not explicitly contribute to intergroup theory, despite the book's title. Rather, the importance of their work, in my opinion, rests with the empirical results they produced, even though the interpretation of their findings remains problematical. In addition, the research process demonstrated a long-term commitment to understanding and a repeated willingness to revise methods and interpretations in light of unanticipated findings.

The Hawthorne studies began with the aim of investigating the "relation of quality and quantity of illumination to efficiency in industry" (Cass and Zimmer 1975). It ended by proposing that industrial organizations be viewed as social systems in which every part bears a relation of interdependence to every other part (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939). The initial orientation was largely based on the disciplines of physics and engineering, and the concluding position set the stage for several generations of work in psychology, sociology, and organizational behavior. Beginning hypotheses were concerned with one-way causality between illumination and productivity. The final conceptualization emphasized multiple levels of analysis, multidirectional causes and effects, and multiple theories of explanation.

The steps from opening to closing modes of understanding included experimental, survey, and interventionist methodologies, but neither the original writers nor their contemporary interpreters were as catholic in their perceptions of intergroup effects. Despite several revisions in concept and method, the investigators did

not arrive at an explicitly intergroup formation of social system dynamics even though the data for such a position were abundant. Data relevant to gender, age, and ethnicity were reported throughout the study (see Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939, e.g., pp. 349, 360, 491), yet they did not enter into the final conceptual analysis. As recently as 1975, commentators on the Hawthorne legacy continued to refer to people who participated in the illumination experiments as "the girls" (Cass and Zimmer 1975, 279ff.).

In the chronology of methodologies employed in the Hawthorne studies were several efforts to isolate work groups in order to observe their behavior carefully. This occurred both in the illumination studies and in the bank wiring-room research. The investigators report evidence concerning reactive effect of these moves in both instances. Yet they miss the opportunity to conceptualize their experimental interventions as changes in the intergroup relations between the factory as a whole and the research participants and between the isolated groups and themselves as a "research group" with a position related to the organization hierarchy. As open as they were in methodological strategy, they did not have the conceptual or technical equipment to examine the consequences of their own group behavior on the system they were learning to study. Unwittingly they may have begun a tradition of experimental research on small groups that closed off the groups under study and the researchers from being aware of their intergroup relationships. The study of "group dynamics" as mainly internal relations among group members without attention to how the groups under study related to the larger social system in which they were embedded accelerated in the years after Hawthorne.

There are clues in Roethlisberger's (1977, 14-15) autobiography about the origins of the Hawthorne researchers' blindness to intergroup issues. Describing his decision to "disinherit" (his word) himself from his family, he wrote,

I was an American—an isolationist by factors then unknown to me . . . who was not going to have anything to do with the mighty battles fought in Switzerland between the Canton de Bern and the Canton de Vaux or with the Franco-Prussian War. This was America, where race, color, creed, birth, heredity, nationality, family, and so forth, did not count and where individual merit, skill, competence, knowledge, liberty, freedom, and so on did. I believed it with all my heart and in a crazy way, in spite of many subsequent experiences to the contrary. I still do [emphasis added].

Is it possible that Roethlisberger could not permit his theory of organization to contain concepts that he was unable to integrate within his own self-perception?

Le Bon, the Frenchman who was able to talk about group differences, made an observation that anticipated Roethlisberger's difficulty many years before the American reported it. Le Bon (1895, 107-8) wrote,

I shall confine myself to observing that it is precisely the words most often employed by the masses which among different people possess the most different meanings. Such is the case, for instance, with the words "democracy" and "socialism" in such frequent use nowadays.

In reality they correspond to quite contrary ideas and images in the Latin and Anglo-Saxon mind. For the Latin peoples the word "democracy" signifies more especially the subordination of the will and the initiative of the individual to the community represented by the State. Among Anglo-Saxons, and notably in America, this same word "democracy" signifies, on the contrary, the intense development of the will of the individual, and as complete a subordination as possible of the State . . .

From Le Bon's perspective the changed relationship between the individual and the collective signified by "democracy" was quite different for Latin and Anglo-Saxon people. Perhaps for Latins democracy was an alternative to anarchy, while for Anglo-Saxons democracy was preferred to totalitarianism. In the conceptual language of intergroup theory, Latins were responding to democracy as an adjustment to underbounded conditions, and Anglo-Saxons were reacting to democracy as an improvement to overbounded conditions (Alderfer 1980). If this interpretation is valid, it suggests that the meaning of an important term (in this case, *democracy*) depends in part on the group condition of the people using it.

Roethlisberger's life history included parental struggles between a German-Swiss father and a French-Swiss mother. His method of coping with this conflict was flight, and it may have set limits on how able he was to incorporate ethnic differences into his theory of social systems. These two ethnic groups tend to evolve different roles for men and women in the family and therefore may also have influenced how Roethlisberger saw the relations between men and women in his research (McGoldrick 1982).

Group-treatment methods

According to Anthony (1971), the use of groups by therapists to treat individuals' emotional difficulties may have begun as early as 1907. Using groups for clinical intervention adds an important element to the foundation of intergroup perspectives. The practice is only

reasonable if one has a working hypothesis that group forces can be harnessed for constructive ends. In *The Crowd*, Le Bon recognized that groups can have constructive effects, but his emphasis was heavily on destructive irrationality. Moreover, his restrained attitude toward how knowledge of group processes might be used certainly did not suggest that pragmatic values could be served by group-level intervention. Apparently physicians—some of whom were psychiatrists—first used groups for treatment purposes (Anthony 1971). From the beginning, the emotional life of groups became the central feature in their potential role in effecting cures. One early experiment by Joseph Pratt, for example, involved group treatment for individuals with tuberculosis, who were known to be emotionally difficult for people close to them (Anthony 1971).

As soon as a number of individuals are brought together for treatment, the professional faces a choice. To what degree does he or she treat individuals in the group? To what degree does he or she treat the group as a whole? When one moves from the customary one-on-one relationship to a group setting, the natural tendency is to continue working one-on-one with individuals in the group. However, the combination of the intellectual growth of *group* psychology during this period and the living experience of group life in the here-and-now led some of the early group workers to recognize that they could aim their interventions toward the group as a whole rather than, or in addition to, individuals. Interventions aimed at individuals take the form of the therapist's commenting about people by name, for example, "I wonder what it means when Mary sits with her head down, arms tightly clasped, and back bent over." Interventions with the group as a whole take the form of the consultants commenting impersonally on group events, for example, "The group might wish to examine why only the male members have been talking for the last ten minutes."

Advances in psychoanalytic theory and methods in this period also carried important implications for the conduct of group work. From the earliest experiences with their treatment procedures, psychoanalysts had learned the importance of paying careful attention to patients' emotional reactions to them as significant and powerful figures and, in turn, of their analogous feelings toward clients. The terms given to these two classes of emotional process were *transference*, when the origin seemed to be with the patient, and *countertransference*, when the beginning seemed to be with the analyst. In either case, the fundamental idea was that both parties had tendencies to "transfer" or to reproduce the emotional dynamics of relationships with other important people (e.g., parents, lovers) in the therapeutic activities. Without proper attention, transference effects inter-

ferred with therapeutic progress. When the transference was "positive" and unexamined, clients showed dramatic improvements, which did not last when the relationship with the analyst changed. When the transference was "negative" and inadequately worked through, treatment terminated prematurely without significant gains for the client; however, when properly understood and effectively managed, transferential phenomena became a major force in effective treatment. Analysts learned how to be attentive to patients' reactions to them and in turn to their reactions to patients and to comment on these data in ways that could advance treatment. Originally, the discovery of transferential phenomena occurred in the one-on-one relationship between Freud and a female patient (Freud 1905 in Freud 1963). Freud's (1922) *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* brought the same underlying psychological reasoning to the study of group as well as interpersonal behavior.¹

The book begins with a critique of Le Bon's *The Crowd*. The Austrian founder of psychoanalysis was rather mixed in his reactions of the French sociologist's work. Le Bon's attention to the powerful and pervasive operation of unconscious emotional processes "in" (the preposition becomes important) groups drew Freud's approval. But the psychoanalyst was not pleased with how the sociologist explained these effects. The dissatisfaction became an opportunity for Freud to present his own views, and, in the process, to begin the kind of theoretical arguments that would bring the transferential reasoning into the realm of group behavior. One succinct formulation provided by Freud (1922, 99-100) is,

The uncanny and coercive characteristics of group formations, which are shown in their suggestion phenomena, may therefore with justice be traced back to the fact of their origin from the primal horde. The leader of the group is still the dreaded primal father: the group still wishes to be governed by unrestricted force: it has an extreme passion for authority: in Le Bon's phrase, it has a thirst for obedience. The primal father is the group ideal which governs the group in place of the ego ideal. Hypnosis has a good claim to being described as a *group of two* [emphasis added]; there remains as a definition for suggestion—a conviction which is not based upon perception and reasoning but upon an erotic tie. . . . We have come to the conclusion that suggestion is a partial manifestation of the state of hypnosis, and that hypnosis is solidly founded upon a predisposition which has survived in the unconscious from the early history of the human family.

1. My uses of the terms *transference* and *countertransference* here are broader than those of classical psychoanalysis (Singer 1963). They have most in common with the formulation of Frieda Fromm-Reichmann (1950) and have also been significantly affected by Sullivan (1953) and Jung (1946).

Freud's formulation makes explicit the unconscious emotional ties from members to leader and from members to one another. From time to time his work also makes allusion to intergroup forces by the portions of Le Bon to which he refers or by the concrete examples he selects to illustrate his theoretical points (e.g., Freud 1922, 44, 50, 90). Fundamentally, however, Freud's analysis of unconscious emotional processes derives from the one-on-one relationship (the "group of two"). It shall remain for others to carry the analysis of unconscious emotional dynamics more fully into the realm of intergroup relations.

An additional problem posed by the practical application of group work is composing membership. The professional deciding to work with a group for curative purposes must determine who shall be members. Answering this question can hardly escape giving some attention, however implicitly, to intergroup dynamics. By deciding who is to be inside the group, the professional also determines who is outside. Whether conscious of it or not, members of the treatment group will have to deal with nonmembers: their relations with nonmembers will be changed somewhat—and possibly dramatically—by their participation in the treatment.

In 1923 Harry Stack Sullivan undertook a most significant experiment in the treatment of schizophrenics at the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, where he established a special ward in which only male schizophrenics were to receive care. Staff for the special ward were men carefully selected by Sullivan. Many staff were former patients. There was also evidence that Sullivan himself had been a hospitalized patient, although he is not known to have acknowledged his patienthood to more than a few friends (Perry 1982, 3ff). To create the innovative setting, Sullivan had special permission from the administration of the hospital. Part of the "training" for his staff involved meetings at Sullivan's home and included attention to the personal tensions of the staff as well as those of the patients. Sullivan's innovation changed the customary intergroup relationship between male schizophrenics and female nursing staff as well as between his particular patients and the hospital administration as a whole. He did this, of course, without an explicit theory of intergroup relations (see Perry 1982, 189-200). Like some other organization innovations to be described later, Sullivan's "successful" program was eventually terminated. Within the hospital itself he faced difficulties with the nurses (a predominantly female group), and eventually the senior administration of the hospital, which had been most supportive of Sullivan, was pressed by the board of trustees to discontinue Sullivan's activity. Perhaps if Sullivan or others in the setting had been thinking about his innovation from an intergroup perspective in addi-

tion to the intrapsychic and interpersonal viewpoints. he could have found mechanisms to deal with the concerns of the other groups that eventually acted to impede his work.

The fact that many of Sullivan's carefully selected male staff were former patients probably greatly aided their effectiveness in the unit. If Sullivan himself was a recovered patient, that experience probably gave him an understanding, that would be difficult to obtain in any other way, of the male patient group. But, paradoxically, it may also be that Sullivan's reluctance to acknowledge his own patienthood interfered with his capacity to conduct intergroup negotiations on behalf of his unit and thereby was a factor in the demise of the innovation.

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AMONG INTERGROUP PERSPECTIVES

Today there is no single intergroup theory. Instead, there are a variety of conceptual and methodological positions. Clarity about the dimensions on which intergroup perspectives differ sets the stage for understanding the contributions and limitations of any one. Here I shall identify four dimensions on which intergroup perspectives differ. *Level of analysis* pertains to the degree that the group as a unit is central to the conceptual formula. Groups *isolated or embedded* refer to the degree that investigators take into account the contexts in which groups exist. Empirical investigations into group life may be *active or passive* in terms of how investigators relate to the material they study. Finally, researchers may or may not be *reflective* about their own individual position and group memberships in relation to those they study.

Level of analysis

Taken at face value, of course, intergroup theory deals with relations among groups. But intergroup perspectives have varied in the degree of attention they have given to individual, group, and intergroup phenomena. Foci for attention have ranged from personality psychology (e.g., Adorno et al. 1950) to economic sociology (Blalock and Wilken 1976) and cultural anthropology (Otterbein 1977). Intergroup theorists generally accept the validity of multiple levels of analysis: the theory is often attractive because it offers intellectual equipment for cross-level reasoning (Rice 1969).

Given the variations in levels to which intergroup theory might be applied, researchers cannot be equally

attentive to everything. They make choices according to their interests. Often these choices reflect preferences for methods as well as for data.

For the purposes of this article, a crucial choice pertains to whether group-level phenomena become central. Although the group is the intermediate level in the range addressed by intergroup theory, it does not necessarily follow that all intergroup researchers thoroughly attend to the group as a unit worthy of attention in its own right. The idea of "group as a whole" usually includes several elements: (1) a group is different from simply a linear sum of individual members; (2) groups share collectively unconscious assumptions about members' relations to the group's leadership and to one another; and (3) words spoken and actions taken by group members represent the whole group or subgroup of the whole group (Bion 1959; Wells 1980; Agazarian and Peters 1981).

The question of whether the group becomes a unit in intergroup theory has both intellectual and cultural determinants. During the early part of the twentieth century, for example, there was considerable controversy among academic researchers about the concept of "group mind." Le Bon (1895) had started the idea that groups had properties that transcended and, in some cases, overwhelmed individual functioning. At the other pole was a view that vigorously disputed the utility of group-level concepts that existed apart from the functioning of individuals. Floyd H. Allport (1924; cited by Brown and Turner 1981: 33) made the case against group-level concepts as follows:

There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals. Social psychology must not be placed in contradistinction to the psychology of the individual: it is a part of the psychology of the individual, whose behavior it studies in relation to that sector of his environment comprised by his fellows.

Brown and Turner (1981: 34) note that Allport's influence was substantial and that "many social psychologists . . . especially in North America . . . conceptualize such phenomena as group prejudice and social conflict as interpersonal or intrapersonal processes simply writ large." Scholars writing from a North American perspective, and perhaps particularly from the United States, may unwittingly have their "theories" shaped by the national ideology. The U.S. Constitution vigorously defends the rights of individuals; it addresses some questions of "rights" by saying that *individuals* may not be denied the privileges conveyed by citizenship because of their membership in racial, ethnic, or gender groups. Thus, the very ideology of the United States pits the individual against the group. It is not surprising that scholars embedded within this cultural context would

promote theories that were consistent with the national ideology; however, there are empirical findings that support the concept of group-level phenomena independent of (not versus) individual effects (Alderfer 1971; Klein 1977; Alderfer et al. 1983; Smith 1982).

The extent of this cultural influence is illustrated by a recent article from the front page of the *New York Times* entitled "Japan's Schools Stress Group and Discourage Individuality." The article begins with an example from a seventh-grade mathematics class in a Japanese junior high school. A 13-year-old girl is called upon and is unable to answer a question. The *Times* reporter describes the situation.

She stood beside her desk staring at the floor, obviously at a loss to understand the problem. She tried a couple of guesses, then fell silent. Finally the teacher allowed her to sit down.

In an American school, the student would probably have been placed in a slower class where she could work alongside students of comparable ability. In Japan there is no such thing as "tracking."

The social cost of a student's being removed from her peers is viewed as far greater than the frustration of sitting day after day in a class where the pupil does not understand what is going on. . . .

The incident is indicative of how schools here in Japan are inextricably tied to distinctly Japanese values such as the primacy of the group rather than the individual.²

Fiske's implicit theory in the article is clearly of the individual versus group variety. The same events would be reported differently if the reporter used group-level concepts. He might have written.

The Japanese choose not to make separate groups of students according to their apparent levels of ability. They believe that the damage to individuals caused by assigning them to an out-group deemed to be of lesser ability is far greater than whatever gains might be achieved in educational efficiency by such group splitting. In the United States, we are witnessing changes of a similar kind. People with disabilities have organized to persuade school systems not to separate them into "tracks" but rather to include them in the "mainstream" of educational activities.

The rewritten story reflects several aspects of using group-level concepts. First, it recognizes that separating a category of individuals (apparently less-able students)

is a group-level event making at least two groups where formerly there was one. Second, the rewritten account suggests that group-level interventions may help as well as hurt *individuals*. Third, it implicitly seeks to join rather than divide the United States and Japan by showing that similar logic is being used in both countries. Needless to say, the degree of subtlety in all this is not slight. The quoted piece was a news article, not an analysis, column, or editorial.

Within the field of organizational behavior, group-level concepts are employed unevenly. Some researchers give the group a central place in their thinking, while others deal with the phenomena of group life without giving attention to the group per se. Katz and Kahn, for example, in their *Social Psychology of Organizations* (1978) give almost no attention to group-level dynamics. They deal with some of the phenomena of group life by two alternative conceptual devices—the analysis of leadership and the detailed formulation of the concept of role. Both these concepts lend themselves nicely to a substitution for dealing with group effects for investigators who seem to prefer dealing with individual and interpersonal units of analysis rather than with groups as wholes.

One sees similar conceptual assumptions in the presentation of handbook chapters. In the *Handbook of Organizations* (March 1965) there is a chapter called "Small Groups and Large Organizations" by Golembiewski. Despite the suggestive title, the political scientist makes the links from micro to macro levels by the use of supervisor-to-subordinate relations and by subordinate-to-subordinate relations; he thus stays "inside" the group by relying on interpersonal relations as the key mediating process. Later in the same book, Shepard reports on the processes for changing interpersonal and intergroup relationships in organizations. Again there is a suggestion that group-level concepts might be employed, and to a limited extent, they are. The major distinction is between a coercive-compromise mentality and a collaboration-consensus mentality. As Shepard conceives of these states of mind they seem to apply to both individuals and groups. It is clear that the state-of-mind analysis is more fully developed for individuals than for groups. Shepard is able to draw on a variety of studies about healthy individuals to specify what collaborative-consensus mentality means for individuals. He has no similar material for groups. It is also clear that he had at least the beginning of such ideas for groups, because he talks about how groups develop a strategic sense of their relationship to the whole organization, and he recognizes that how members can function in temporary task forces depends on how the groups they represent relate to one another.

2. E. B. Fiske, "Japan's Schools Stress Group and Discourage Individuality," *New York Times*, 11 July 1983. Copyright © 1983 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

The preference for individual and interpersonal concepts among organizational psychologists did not show notable change by the time the *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology* (Dunnette 1976) was prepared. In that collection there was just one paper with *group* in the title, and that was a chapter by Hackman, "Group Influences on Individuals." There was some attention to group-level effects in a chapter on conflict by Thomas, and on change processes by Alderfer.

Researchers from the Tavistock Institute in Great Britain have had a long history of attending to group-level effects. The earliest efforts began with changes in the technology of coal mining (Trist et al. 1963), which in turn induced alterations in the structure of work groups. Later the theory and methods taken from the coal mining work was transferred to weaving mills in India (Rice 1963).

Thus within both academic social psychology and organizational behavior we find differences between those who utilize group-level concepts and those who do not. For theorists who prefer only individual and interpersonal constructs, the notion of group is missing or, in the extreme, actively denied. The converse, however, does not seem to apply. Theorists who attend to group-level phenomena tend also to use individual level. As shown in figure 13.1, we seem to have two distinct modes of conceptualizing individual and group effects. The first emphasizes individual in opposition to group concepts. The operation of group forces as a threat to individuals is incorporated into the theory in such a way that group dynamics are absent if individual consciousness is pres-

ent. The second approach sees the individual and group as more orthogonal. According to this view, group and individual concepts may exist comparatively autonomously. At the very least, this orientation allows for the separate measurement and testing of individual and group effects. It allows for empirical data rather than the declaration of theorists to determine the relative potency of individual and group effects.

Isolated or embedded

The question of isolation or embeddedness depends on whether the theory has a way to deal with how a particular intergroup relationship stands relative to its environment. An illustration may be helpful. One of the most significant studies of intergroup relationships were those conducted by Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn Sherif (1969). In these studies the investigators constructed a series of competitive games between teams of twelve-year-old boys at summer camps. The phenomena they documented pertained to how the external conditions of group competition or cooperation affected the internal dynamics of the groups. As the investigators went about their work, they seemed to take no cognizance of the fact that their groups consisted entirely of boys. Replications were conducted across time, in different geographical settings, and with variation in either the age or the gender of the respondents. The research implicitly assumed that gender has some bearing on their results or on their ability to carry out and replicate their results, or they would not have held gender constant in their studies. But it is not obvious what their assumptions were. The studies were carried out in the late 1940s and early 1950s in the United States. During this period there was relatively little explicit questioning of the relationship between men and women or boys and girls. The pattern of having males as participants in the primary research activities in studies of the Sherif paradigm was also followed by Blake, Shepard, and Mouton (1964), who extended the work to industrial settings.

What is especially interesting about the role of women in the Sherif studies is that both the camp studies and the industrial extensions included women on the research team. The Sherif studies were frequently reported in different places by Carolyn and Muzafer Sherif. The industrial extensions were written by Robert Blake and Jane Mouton. In a summary of the work written for a general audience, Muzafer Sherif discusses various replications of the work and includes references to doctoral dissertations that employed female respondents (Sherif 1966, 96-7). In at least two reports Sherif (1966) and Sherif and Sherif (1969) discuss the nature of gener-




Figure 13.1 Two models of conceptualizing the relationship between individual and group effects

alizations to other forms of intergroup relations that might be made from their research. Included in these discussions are extensions to international relations, labor management conflict, and inter-ethnic relations. No mention was made of extensions to male-female relations, and I know of no attention by the Sherifs to how their paradigm might respond to mixed gender groups and to studies that varied the proportion of men and women in experimental groups. There are, however, interesting data on the Carolyn-Muzafer relationship in the 1966 report of their work, entitled *In Common Predicament*. Muzafer Sherif (p. xiii) writes in the preface,

Carolyn Sherif shared with me all the effort of putting together the material to go into this book, in organizing it through long hours of discussion, in writing much of what are probably its best chapters, and, not least, in going through the prolonged efforts and pain of revision. In spite of this she has resisted my urging that she share the title page with me. Yet I want to make it clear that this is a Sherif and Sherif work like several others published earlier.

From these words, one may suggest that the way the Sherifs handled their female-male differences may have affected how they conducted, reported, and interpreted their research. There does seem to be a context—characteristic of both the times in which they did their work and in the collaboration itself—in which the pattern of relations between men and women working together are not examined or conceptualized.

Suppose the Sherifs had given more thorough and explicit attention to their own work relationship in terms of female-male dynamics: how might that have affected their research? The answers to this question are, of course, speculative. They are given to explain what it means to conduct research with consciousness of the embeddedness of intergroup relations and how that awareness can affect various elements of the investigation, not to criticize Carolyn and Muzafer Sherif personally. In fact, the responses to this question should be viewed as group-level interpretations and predictions.

Here then are the changes that might have occurred in the Sherif and Sherif paradigm: (1) There would have been explicit discussion about the proportions of boys and girls in the original studies and of men and women in the adult extensions. (2) These discussions would probably have led to some systematic variation in the female-male proportions in the series of studies employing the Sherif and Sherif paradigm. (3) As a result, there would be data on how the intergroup dynamics, so clearly documented by the studies, are affected by varying the proportions of men and women in the groups. (4) There would be data on whether female and male participants

experienced the phenomena in similar or different ways as a function of the proportions of each gender in the groups. (5) Discussion of how the findings apply to practical problems would include attention to male-female relations. (6) Authorship and acknowledgments of the research reports would include cases where Carolyn was the first or only author and would not include prefatory comments by one of the partners that explained why one of the partners deserved but did not accept joint authorship.

Research and development or clinical methods

At the outset I noted that intergroup research has a long tradition of being concerned about social problems. Most intergroup research people take their subjects for investigation from "the real world" and aim to influence practical affairs with their findings. There is little in any facet of intergroup research that works *only* toward knowledge for its own sake; however, within the general orientation of seeking understanding both for the advancement of understanding and for improving social conditions there are important differences in research methods.

In a paper reviewing research on stereotyping and intergroup behavior, Thomas Pettigrew (1981) identified three wings of social psychology. He called them "experimental social psychology," "symbolic interactionism," and "contextual social psychology." The chief differences among these subgroups turn on their methods and the journals in which they publish their research. Pettigrew was also alert to how generational differences among social scientists and organizational locations also are associated with their intellectual products. According to Pettigrew (1981), experimental social psychologists focus on individual-level properties, operate in the laboratory chiefly with college sophomores as "subjects," and thereby achieve internal validity at the expense of external generalizability. Symbolic interactionists work in the field of naturally occurring events, attend to dynamics of social process, and collect data by observing, interviewing, and retrieving. From Pettigrew's perspective the symbolic interactionists achieve external validity at the price of internal rigor. Finally, there is the third subgroup of contextual social psychologists in whose membership Pettigrew places himself. This group seems to share in the best of both worlds—achieving internal validity through probability samples and quasi-experimental designs and attaining external validity by the variety of settings in which members act as researchers.

From my perspective, there is also a fourth subgroup, which Pettigrew's analysis omits. All the subgroups that he describes share a similar idea of

application." When research results have achieved the appropriate degree of validity, they are to be transferred to policy makers, who, in turn, will be guided by them in making or changing public policy. A good example of this sort of application is the use of Clark and Clark's (1947) race research in the shaping of the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision to end the *separate but equal* doctrine of public education. I give the term research and development to the orientation that establishes research results separately from utilization and then applies the findings to social and organizational problems. Investigators who work in this manner are similar to many physical scientists who develop their innovations comparatively independently of the people who will use them. An alternative approach, representing a fourth group, which Pettigrew omits is clinical research.

Erik Erikson (1964) has put it this way: "One can study the nature of things by doing something *to* them, but one can really learn something about the essential nature of living beings only by doing something *with* them or *for* them. This, of course, is the principle of clinical science." For the research and development orientation to intergroup research something is done *to* one set of people (often called subjects) so that something might be done *with* and *for* another set. For the clinical orientation to intergroup research something is done with and for respondents.

A key difference between research and development versus clinical social psychologists turns on beliefs (and, for some, theories) about how much and in what ways the different styles contaminate the phenomena they study. The R & D position is that by taking a "scientific" role and by exercising careful controls researchers can minimize their contamination of the phenomena under study. In this manner they more closely approximate objectively reliable and reproducible findings. Their criticism of clinical methods is that investigators become excessively involved with their data and thereby lose objectivity. According to the R & D group, the products of clinical methods are not research data, but anecdotal accounts that, however interesting, do not qualify as valid research findings. Thus, Pettigrew omits clinical social psychologists from his subgroup delineation.

The clinical critique of R & D social psychology is that research is intervention (and often intrusion). The question is not *whether* to influence the phenomena under study but *how* (Berg 1980). Laboratory social psychologists create temporary social systems to do their research work. They exercise legitimate authority by virtue of university faculty roles when they invite or require sophomores to participate in experiments. They alter existing group membership and authority relations when they join existing social systems as participant observers. They represent private or public organizations when they

conduct survey interviews. For clinical social psychologists, objectivity is sufficiently elusive as not to be a primary goal, regardless of method or subject matter. Rather than attempting to produce bias-free research, we attempt to understand and acknowledge the inevitable bias in any research and seek, rather, to specify the conditions for reproducing the results we report. According to this reasoning, reproduction of research results is not just an empirical exercise whereby the same laboratory instructions, the same questionnaire, the same interview questions, or the same kind of people are repeatedly studied. Rather, reproduction of results is a theoretical *and* empirical matter in which theory is used to develop methods of research as well as to predict and interpret findings (Alderfer and Smith 1982; Alderfer et al. 1983).

Thus, for clinical organizational psychologists, research is not separated cleanly into investigation and application phases. The alternative mode is continuing exchange between intervention and understanding. Clinical organizational psychologists believe that research data are importantly shaped by the relationships between investigators and respondents as well as by the phenomena being studied. They believe that the goal of excellence in research is best served by being conscious of those relationships and by altering them as appropriate and possible.

Individual and group reflection

In conducting research, investigators vary significantly in whether they have a theory-based method for examining and managing relationships with the people they study. It is probably fair to say that most social scientists have some awareness of their entanglements with what they study, yet few have a disciplined, systematic way of understanding and managing how they affect and are affected by their work. Data-generation methods implicitly shape researcher-respondent relationships either by aiming for minimal influence (participant observation, survey-interviewing) or by exercising tight control (laboratory experimentation).

Preceding sections contained a variety of examples in which researchers seemed to shape their investigations in important ways without being aware of what they were doing. Here, I summarize the more important episodes for two reasons. First, putting several cases in one place gives a clearer sense of their frequency. My own experience is that most investigators prefer not to think too hard about or observe too carefully these matters. Second, having several instances together helps a reader test the utility of concepts that will be proposed to explain and predict researcher-respondent relationships.

theory-based method

The aim of reviewing these episodes is not, however, to criticize the investigators whose work is cited. We would not have an opportunity to learn from their experience if they had not reported it. The fact that the "data" I cite, for the most part, do not come from the "results" sections of their research reports is much more of a statement about the ideology of the research culture in which they worked than an assessment of them as individuals.

1. Marilyn Brewer and Donald Campbell (1976) did not seem to notice that their questionnaire for studying East African tribes emerged from a predominantly white male, northern European-American scientific culture. The research team did show cognizance of how *other* investigators' group identifications might have affected their perceptions of intergroup relations. They also did not reflect upon how their own gender differences, and how they managed them, might have influenced the research.

2. Fritz Roethlisberger and William Dickson omit consideration of age, gender, and ethnicity in their social systems conception of the Hawthorne plant. In his "intellectual autobiography," Roethlisberger describes his own commitment to "individual merit" to the extrusion of group-level variables.

3. Harry Stack Sullivan did not seem to be aware of the female-male and administration-patient dynamics he altered when he created an innovative treatment setting for male schizophrenics. As a result, an innovation that many people today consider successful was terminated. Sullivan himself left the setting and turned away from hospital psychiatry.

4. Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif omit explicit consideration of female-male differences in their account of the boys' camp experiment on intergroup conflict and cooperation. Muzafer Sherif later gives a report on Carolyn Sherif's dropping authorship for an overview report of these studies despite clear acknowledgment of her extensive contribution to the work. In generalizing the implications of their work to an array of intergroup circumstances, the Sherifs omit discussion of men and women.

5. A counterexample seems to be Gustave Le Bon. The French sociologist gave attention to how the concept of democracy varied between Northern European and Latin peoples. He did this in the context of reflecting upon the consequences of revolution and its aftermath in his own country. In the process, he gave especially detailed attention to power of unconscious forces in group life; however, Le Bon's acknowledgment of group-level forces on his own work was more implicit than explicit. He did not offer a set of concepts or methods for investigators to follow in order to take

account of the impact of their own individual and group identifications on their research.

Among sociologists who do participant observation, there is a literature reporting researcher-respondent relationships in some detail (Whyte 1955b; Adams and Preiss 1960; Filstead 1970; McCall and Simmons 1969). An interesting effect of the phenomena is that reporting seems to be dominated by relatively junior investigators describing experiences associated with dissertations. In sociology, Bill Whyte may have started it all by publishing an appendix to *Street Corner Society* in 1955.

In clinical psychology and psychiatry, however, the tradition is much older, beginning with Freud's work on transference and countertransference (Menninger 1958). Within the classical psychoanalytic tradition, transference and countertransference are interpreted in terms of unconscious personality and interpersonal dynamics. Initially, the reaction to the phenomena by Freud himself was to call upon the analyst to become surgeon-like—cool and aloof. As the phenomena became more fully understood and accepted, attitudes changed. Rather than something to be denied and avoided, countertransference feelings in the analyst became an important source of treatment data, which can provide clues about the interaction between the personalities of analyst and patient, and can serve both, if effectively examined and utilized (Searles 1955).

Group-level transference, however, has received far less thorough attention. Thanks to Whyte and others who follow his lead, there is an empirical literature identifying the empirical phenomena, although Whyte himself provides no conceptualization. The tendency for this material to come from younger people and to be reported without theoretical commentary, however, has worked against its being incorporated into the main currents of social-research method and theory. When senior people do not report their personal experiences, it is as if the collective assumption among social scientists is that group-level transference and countertransference go away as investigators mature. One could hardly argue that investigators stop having gender, ethnicity, age, and organizational affiliations or that people stop noticing these attributes as researchers become more established professionals. There is, however, another view that takes account of both group- and individual-level transference and incorporates the phenomena into what is viewed as the natural ongoing activities of the social scientist.

The first person I know of to incorporate the two levels of understanding was George Devereux, who decided to conduct and report psychotherapy with a Plains Indian with a conscious awareness of both personality development and of areal culture patterns (De-

vereux 1968). In conducting therapy, Devereux (1968) dealt with both individual- and group-level transference. In writing his book, he perceptively managed his intergroup relationship between the Plains Indian culture, which he entered as an employee of the Veterans Administration, and the white-male-dominant European-American culture that he belonged to by birth.

Conceptually, Devereux called upon anthropological analyses of Plains Indians to provide the group-level knowledge necessary to understand the group membership of his patient. He integrated this group-level knowledge with classical psychoanalytic personality theory to form a notion of the ethnic personality. In the therapy itself he examined and utilized the transference phenomena of the patient to him in terms of behaviors characteristic of the patient's tribal life. Thus, the concrete content of the transference was therapist as "guardian spirit." In terms of therapeutic objectives and outcomes, the intergroup differences between Devereux's own culture and his patient's were made very explicit. His general aim was "to restore the person to himself." In this particular case that self was a Plains Indian substantially identified with his tribal culture, and it was a culture that was in acute distress in response to its historically determined destructive relationship with the dominant white American culture.

Presenting his material to a predominantly white American culture, Devereux (1968) took account of that culture's relationship to Indians. He addressed the key elements in the classical perception of Indians by whites as inferior. In the 1968 edition of the book, he also dealt with critical reactions to the book from members of the dominant culture.³ In the process, he took the opportunity to refuse certain laudatory comments while interpreting the group-level basis of their origin. An especially poignant example is his reaction to words from Karl Menninger, who is one of the most widely respected practitioner-theorists of individual-interpersonal psychoanalysis. "In his Preface to the first edition, Dr. Karl Menninger commended my willingness to shoulder my share of America's guilt toward the Indian. But I feel no more guilty of these crimes than for the Athenians massacre of the Melians" (Devereux, 1967, xxxiv).

Here Menninger apparently makes a group-level attribution to Devereux, who refuses to accept it. The interesting question is whether Devereux refuses because he does not believe he is influenced by group-level forces (i.e., he is *just* an individual) or because he believes that Menninger has given him the wrong group membership (i.e., he identifies more with the continental French than

with Americans). My own impression is that the matter is more of Menninger's getting the wrong group than of Devereux's denying the effects of his own group memberships; however, in the Plains Indian study, the matter is not clarified. In that book, Devereux is much more explicitly attentive to transference than to countertransference issues. Devereux devotes an entire volume to countertransference reactions in social research and, in that volume, draws on many concrete examples from his own experience, which includes *both* individual- and group-level processes.

In taking Devereux's (1967) work with the Plains Indian as a clear example of an investigator's using group and individual transference, one should also be clear that his target for intervention was the individual. As therapist, Devereux observed and utilized the effects of group-level forces on his client and on himself in relation to his client. The target for intervention, however, remained the person. There was no attempt to work with his client's tribal group. Nor was there any indication that the group-level concepts Devereux used fruitfully to assist his patient could have been employed to aid the Indian's tribe.

Having posited the observation of group-level transferences, I wish to conclude this section by suggesting why the phenomena have been so widely overlooked. The reasons are several. None are particularly comfortable to bear if accepted. Most call for some degree of reorientation in feeling, thinking, and acting among social researchers.

To accept the validity of these processes is to take on an unending task of self- and group-scrutiny. In the extreme, it means one should be regularly asking the question, "How is what I am as a person and group representative shaping what I am finding?" This is a demanding undertaking often characterized by emotional turbulence.

To acknowledge the force of transferential and countertransferential processes is to revise significantly the meaning of objectivity. In the extreme, it means that it may be impossible to separate data from the relationship among parties associated with data collection (Berg 1984). The pursuit of objective information therefore requires relationship skills—both interpersonal and intergroup—and a new degree of tentativeness that takes account of the limits of any person's or group's capacity to influence the nature of a relationship with other parties.

To face the effects of group-level transference is to recognize that there may be circumstances in which one person alone cannot advance knowledge. One solution to the effects of group forces is to form groups that are capable of reflecting upon themselves in order to under-

group membership

1

2

3

3. The original edition of the Plains Indian study was published in 1951.

stand group and intergroup relations. The well-worn model of a single investigator alone in search of understanding must be complemented by teams of individuals composed to reflect the group-level differences among members (Alderfer and Smith 1982). Faced with this alternative, investigators may confront a new level of awareness concerning both how and why our knowledge of human behavior is limited. On this point, the difference between individual- and group-level transference becomes particularly significant. Working only with individual dynamics, one can maintain a realistic goal of continuously expanding self-awareness. Given an array of techniques for self-scrutiny, an investigator can at least approach the ideal of full self-understanding, even though in practice all accept the human limits of such a quest. But at the group level, there are sharper limits. There are groups to which we all belong that cannot change (e.g., gender, family, ethnicity). It is especially difficult for groups to engage in self-examination under conditions of intergroup conflict. To the extent that group memberships and relations among groups shape how others react to us and how we perceive those reactions, we are indeed captured by the groups to which we belong. We are, of course, most fully prisoner of those groups of whose membership we remain unaware (Smith 1982).

A THEORY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS

In the two preceding sections I sought to establish two metatheoretical points. The first was to establish intergroup theory in general as a way of thinking about problems of human behavior: the aim was to distinguish intergroup theory from nonintergroup theory. The second was to determine dimensions on which particular versions of intergroup theory varied from one another: the objective was to differentiate among versions of intergroup theories. This section now presents a particular version of intergroup theory.

According to the dimensions of difference among intergroup theories, it has the following properties:

1. The group is the primary level of analysis.
2. Groups appear embedded in social systems.
3. The orientation toward research is clinical.
4. Concepts from the theory apply to researchers as well as to respondents.

Historically, the theory evolved inductively from anomalous research findings and mistakes in social inter-

vention. Studies crucial to identifying the need for such a theory have been concerned with generational struggles in management development (Alderfer 1971; 1977a), leadership struggles in labor-management relations (Lewicki and Alderfer 1973), and organization development in a boarding school (Alderfer and Brown 1975). Research that has proved fruitful in establishing the deductive utility of the theory addressed labor-management cooperation (Alderfer 1977b) and race relations in management (Alderfer et al. 1980; Alderfer et al. 1983). The theoretical perspective has also proved useful in understanding the behavior of behavioral scientists in their roles as research interpreters, teachers, and investigators (Alderfer 1970a; 1971). The chief intellectual ancestor of the formulation is A. K. Rice's (1969) effort to explain the interdependence among individual, group, and intergroup processes. Material presented in this section closely follows formulations elsewhere (Alderfer 1977b; Alderfer and Smith 1982; Alderfer et al. 1984).

Definition of groups in organizations

Within the social psychology literature there is no shortage of definitions of groups, but there is also no clear consensus among those who propose definitions (Cartwright and Zander 1968). Because much of the work leading to these definitions has been done by social psychologists studying internal properties of groups in laboratories, the resulting concepts have been comparatively limited in recognizing the external properties of groups. Looking at groups in organizations, however, produces a definition that gives more-balanced attention to both internal and external properties.

A human group is a collection of individuals (1) who have significantly interdependent relations with each other, (2) who perceive themselves as a group, reliably distinguishing members from nonmembers, (3) whose group identity is recognized by nonmembers, (4) who, as group members acting alone or in concert, have significantly interdependent relations with other groups, and (5) whose roles in the group are therefore a function of expectations from themselves, from other group members, and from non-group members. (Alderfer 1977a)

This idea of a group begins with individuals who are interdependent, moves to the sense of the group as a significant social object whose boundaries are confirmed from inside and outside, recognizes that the group as a whole is an interacting unit through representatives or by collective action, and returns to the individual members whose thoughts, feelings, and actions are deter-




Figure 13.2 Intergroup transaction between individuals

mined by forces within the individual and from both group members and nongroup members. This conceptualization of a group makes every individual member into a group representative wherever he or she deals with members of other groups and treats transactions among individuals as at least, in part, intergroup events (Rice 1969; Smith 1977).

Figure 13.2 shows an "intergroup transaction between individuals." This is another way of reconceptualizing what may usually be thought of as an interpersonal transaction. In the diagram, there are three classes of forces corresponding to intrapersonal, intragroup, and intergroup dynamics. The general point is that any exchange between people is subject to all three kinds of forces: most people (including behavioral scientists) tend to understand things mainly in intrapersonal or interpersonal terms. Which class of forces becomes most dominant at any time depends on how the specific dimensions at each level of analysis differentiate the individuals. Suppose I_1 is a male engineering supervisor and I_2 is a female union steward. Intrapersonally I_1 prefers abstract thinking and demonstrates persistent difficulty in expressing feelings; I_2 prefers concrete thinking and shows ease in expressing feelings. G_1 is a predominantly male professional group that communicates to I_1 that he at all times should stay in control and be rational. G_2 is a predominantly female clerical group that communicates to I_2 that she should be more assertive about the needs of the G_2 's. The $I-G_{1,2}$ relationship includes ten years of labor-management cooperation punctuated by a series of recent strike (from the labor side) and termination (from the management side) threats. The tradition in much of behavioral-science intervention is to focus on the I dynamics and to give little or no attention to G or $I-G$ forces (Argyris 1962; Walton 1969).

By viewing transactions between individuals from an intergroup perspective, an observer learns to examine the condition of each participant's group, the relationship of participants to their groups, and the

relationship between groups represented by participants as well as their personalities in each "interpersonal" relationship. Thus, in the earlier example reporting Devereux's psychotherapy with a Plains Indian, the investigator described the patient's personality, his relationship to his tribe, and the relationships among his tribe, other tribes, and the dominant U.S. culture.

Properties of intergroup relations

Research on intergroup relations has identified a number of properties characteristic of intergroup relations, regardless of the particular groups or the specific setting where the relationship occurs (Sumner 1906; Coser 1956; Van Den Berge 1972; Levine and Campbell 1972; Billig 1976; Alderfer 1977). These phenomena include

1. Group boundaries. Group boundaries, both physical and psychological, determine who is a group member and regulate transactions among groups by variations in their permeability (Alderfer 1977b). Boundary permeability refers to the ease with which boundaries can be crossed.

2. Power differences. Groups differ in the types of resources they can obtain and use (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950). The variety of dimensions on which there are power differences and the degree of discrepancy among groups on these dimensions influence the degree of boundary permeability among groups.

3. Affective patterns. The permeability of group boundaries varies with the polarization of feeling among the groups; that is, to the degree that group members split their feelings so that mainly positive feelings are associated with their own group and mainly negative feelings are projected onto other groups (Sumner 1906; Coser 1956; Levine and Campbell 1972).

4. Cognitive formations, including "distortions." As a function of power differences and affective patterns.

groups tend to develop their own language (or elements of language, including social categories), condition their members' perceptions of objective and subjective phenomena, and transmit sets of propositions—including theories and ideologies—to explain the nature of experiences encountered by members and to influence relations with other groups (Sherif and Sherif 1969; Blake, Shepard, and Mouton 1964; Tajfel 1970; Billig 1976).

5. Leadership behavior. The behavior of group leaders and of members representing a group reflects the boundary permeability, power differences, affective patterns, and cognitive formations of their group in relation to other groups. The behavior of group representatives, including formally designated leaders, is both cause and effect of the total pattern of intergroup behavior in a particular situation.

Group relations in organizations

Every organization consists of a large number of groups, and every organization member represents a number of these groups in dealing with other people in the organization. The full set of groups in an organization can be divided into two broad classes: identity groups and organizational groups. An identity group may be thought of as a group whose members share some common biological characteristic (such as gender), have participated in equivalent historical experiences (such as migration), currently are subjected to similar social forces (such as unemployment), and as a result have consonant world views. The coming together of world views by people who are in the same group occurs because of their having like experiences and developing shared meanings of these experiences through exchanges with other group members. As people enter organizations they carry with them their ongoing membership in identity groups based on variables such as their ethnicity, gender, age, and family. An organizational group may be conceived of as one whose members share (approximately) common organizational positions, participate in equivalent work experiences, and, as a consequence, have consonant organizational views. Organizations assign their members to organizational groups based on division of labor and hierarchy of authority. One critical factor in understanding intergroups in organizations is that identity-group membership and organizational-group membership are frequently highly related. Depending on the nature of the organization and the culture in which it is embedded, certain organizational groups tend to be populated by members of particular identity groups. In the United States, for example, upper-management positions tend

to be held by older white males, and certain departments and ranks tend to be more accepting of females and minorities than others (Loring and Wells 1972; Purcell and Cavanagh 1972).

Considering the definition of a human group given above, we can observe how both identity groups and organizational groups fit the five major criteria. First, identity-group members have significant interdependencies because of their common historical experiences, and organizational groups, because of their equivalent work or organizational experiences, which result in their sharing similar fates even though members may be unaware of their relatedness or even actively deny it. Second, organization-group and identity-group members can reliably distinguish themselves as members from nonmembers on the basis of either identity factors (ethnicity, gender, etc.) or of location in the organization. However, the precision of this identification process can vary, depending on both the permeability of group boundaries and the fact that many groups overlap significantly, with individuals having multiple group memberships. A similar point applies to the third definitional characteristic, the ability of nonmembers to recognize members: this again will vary, depending on the permeability of the group's boundaries. The less permeable the boundaries, the more easily recognizable are members. The fourth and fifth aspects of the definition are highly linked when applied to identity and organizational groups. For example, members may be more or less aware of the extent to which they are acting, or being seen, as group representatives when relating to individuals from other groups. Every person has a number of identity- and organizational-group memberships. At any given moment an individual may be simultaneously a member of a large number, if not all, of these groups. However, which group will be focal at the moment will depend on who else representing which other groups is present and what identity-group and organizational-group issues are critical in the current intergroup exchanges. A white person in a predominantly black organization, for example, can rarely escape representing "white people" at some level, regardless of performance. But the same white person placed in a predominantly white organization will not be seen as representing "white people," but rather some other group, such as a particular hierarchical level. Rarely are individuals "just people" when they act in organizations. When there are no other group representatives present, individuals may experience themselves as "just people" in the context of their own group membership, but this subjective experience will quickly disappear when the individual is placed in a multiple-group setting. How group members relate to each other within their group, and to the

expectations placed upon them by others, is highly dependent on the nature of both the intragroup and intergroup forces active at that time.

The concepts of identity groups and organizational groups do not permit an exhaustive listing of the elements in either set. In any particular setting, the relevant identity groups and organizational groups can be determined only by detailed study using intergroup methods. But it is possible to specify the more frequently observed identity groups and organizational groups and to note major issues around which those intergroup relations develop.⁴

IDENTITY GROUPS

The essential characteristic of identity groups is that individuals join them at birth. While there is little choice about physical membership in identity groups, there is some degree of "negotiation" about psychological membership. A person may behave, think, and feel more or less as if he or she is a member of an identity group. Identity-group membership precedes organizational-group membership. The identity groups to which we give attention are gender, ethnicity, family, and age.

Gender differences between men and women in organizations reflect the effects of unequal influence, stereotypical perceptions, and sexuality. Although we are living in an era of significant social change, the historical and contemporary relationships between men and women in the United States are unequal. In general, women tend to have less access to a variety of resources (e.g., income, position, and information) than men. There are views held by many men about the fitness of women for certain kinds of responsibilities, and there are increasingly successful efforts on the part of women and men to identify and change the consequences of these perceptions both for themselves and for the total culture. Research on female-male dynamics in organizations has documented structural, interpersonal, and personal effects of the power and perception inequalities between men and women (see Kanter 1977; Filem 1974).

Male-female dynamics in organizations are also determined by sexual dynamics, an area in which there has been little research, for understandable reasons. There are cultural taboos against discussing sexual behavior, except under relatively narrowly defined circumstances (e.g., with one's sex partner, in a therapy setting, or as part of legal proceedings to determine whether sex-

ual harassment has occurred). But these prohibitions and inhibitions do not keep sexual feelings from arising and influencing the behavior and perceptions of men and women in organizations.

Ethnic differences are closely tied to the historical relationships between the most numerous ethnic groups in a region (Van Den Berge 1972; Te Selle 1973; Glazer and Moynihan 1975). Specific kinds of work and organizational roles tend to be available only to members of particular ethnic groups. Struggles among ethnic groups for control of material, positional, and informational resources are more visible at some times (e.g., when violence breaks out or when nonviolent demonstrations occur) than at others (e.g., when surface appearances suggest peace). The potential for serious conflict among ethnic groups is present as long as access to resources is understood to be inequitably distributed and group members believe that their ethnic identity is the basis for their losing or not receiving access to resources. In the United States some of the most severe ethnic conflicts have been between blacks and whites (Kerner and Lindsay 1968).

As a result of cultural traditions and contemporary experiences, ethnic groups develop different ways of explaining what happens to themselves and to others: they have different "theories" to explain the world. Dominant groups tend to assume that their theories are correct. They either define other groups' views as wrong or they remain largely unaware that alternative theories exist. Less-dominant groups tend to be aware of both majority and minority theories, they expect their theories to be ignored or devalued by dominant groups, and they may try to make their theories dominant (Billig 1976).

Family groups play an especially prominent role in business enterprises that were built around the contributions of family members (see Sofer 1961; Miller and Rice 1967). Family groups become a significant force shaping intergroup relations after the business grows to the point where nonfamily people are necessary to maintain or enhance the human capacities of the organization. When a substantial proportion of nonfamily members become organization members, the intergroup relationship between family and nonfamily members takes on the dynamics of an overbounded system (i.e., the family) dealing with an underbounded system (i.e., the nonfamily).⁵ Family members face questions about whether they wish to share or give up control of the

4. The treatment given to each of these in the following paragraph is inevitably incomplete. A more extended analysis of ethnicity, gender, and age as they relate to organizations and organizational groups may be found in Alderter (1977a), which also includes an extended bibliography. Guzzo and Epstein (1979) provide an analogous bibliography on family business, and Paulino and McCrady (1978) present a most useful collection of essays on families.

5. Clearly not all families are overbounded systems. But it seems unlikely that members of a family who work in the same family-owned business can escape being overbounded as a result of their internal dynamics and their relations with nonfamily members.

enterprise to nonfamily members. Nonfamily members struggle with whether they wish to remain psychologically outside the family or strive to earn the status of adopted daughters or sons, thereby enhancing their influence as individuals while maintaining the dominance of the founding family.

The pattern of relations between family members and nonfamily members is also related to generational intergroup dynamics. Nonfamily members often must compete with daughters and sons of the entrepreneur for positions of influence in the enterprise. Children of the entrepreneur, depending on the nature of their family relationships, must struggle more or less with their parents about whether they stay in or leave the business and with the implications of that decision for their standing in the family and in the business.

Generational groups, unlike the other identity groups, have the property that everyone who lives long enough will inevitably belong to several. As a result, members of older groups have the potential for developing empathy for members of younger groups because they inevitably have had some of the same experiences. But members of younger groups, because of their more limited experience, have far less potential for understanding the experiences of members of older groups. Levinson et al. (1978), for example, have noted the rather profound ways that individuals do not understand the significance of life events until they have passed through identifiable phases.

The patterns of dominance and subordination characteristic of generational groups are also unique in relation to other identity groups. In the culture of the United States, members of the middle-aged group (roughly late-thirties to late-fifties) tend to dominate both younger and older groups. But the younger people contend with their subordination knowing that at least some of their members will reach more influential positions, while the older people face the reality that their influence is determined to decrease with the passage of time. Generational groups tend to be bound together by their members' sharing a common historical experience that in some material and symbolic way resulted in their members' sharing a common deprivation (Feurer 1969).

* The loosely defined ideology that evolves from the generational experience provides the rationale both for one generational group's rebelling or resisting another and for one group's dominating the others.

ORGANIZATIONAL GROUPS

The essential characteristic of organizational groups is that individuals belong to them as a function of negotiated exchange between the person and the organization. Often the exchange is voluntary, as when a per-

son decides to work to earn a living or volunteers to work for a community agency. But the exchange may also be involuntary, as when children must attend school, draftees must join the military, and convicted criminals must enter a prison. Regardless of whether the exchange about entry is mainly voluntary or involuntary, becoming an organizational member assigns a person to membership in both a task group and a hierarchical group. A person who stops being an organization member, for whatever reason, also gives up membership in the task and hierarchical groups. In this way task-group and hierarchical-group memberships differ from identity-group affiliations.

Task-group membership arises because of the activities (or, in some unusual cases, such as prisons or hospitals, the inactivities) members are assigned to perform. The activities typically have a set of objectives, role relationships, and other features that shape the task-group members' experiences. As a result, people develop a perspective on their own group, other groups, and the organization as a whole, which in turn shapes their behavior and attitudes.

Membership in task groups also tends to be transferable from one organization to another because people can carry the knowledge and skills necessary to perform particular tasks with them if they leave one system and attempt to join another. As a function of developing and maintaining certain knowledge and skills, people may belong to known professional or semiprofessional organizations outside their employing (or confining) organizations. Support from these "outside interest groups" may help people achieve more power within the system where they are working, and it may make it more possible for them to leave one system and join another.

Hierarchical-group membership is assigned by those in the system with the authority to determine rank in the system. The determination of a member's hierarchical position in an organization is typically a carefully controlled, and often highly secret, process. One's place in the hierarchy determines one's legitimate authority, decision-making autonomy, scope of responsibility, and, frequently, access to benefits of membership. Group effects of the hierarchy arise from the nature of the work required of people who occupy the different levels, from the various personal attributes that the work calls for from incumbents, and from the relations that develop between people who occupy different positions in the hierarchy (Smith 1982; Oshry 1977).

People at the top of the hierarchy carry the burden of responsibility for large segments of the institution (or for the whole organization). They have access to more resources than lower-ranking members, including relatively more autonomy in determining how to define and

conduct their assignments. They also tend to maintain a larger network of relationships with key people outside the institution than lower-ranking members.

By the very nature of the hierarchy, people at or near the top have more potential power than lower-ranking people. However great their actual power, higher-ranking people tend to be seen by lower-ranking members as possessing more power than they experience themselves as being able to use effectively. The world confronted by higher-ranking people is typically very complex, and the untoward effects of misusing their power is often much clearer to them than to lower-ranking people, who typically face less complicated environments.

The positional attributes of higher-ranking people affect communications with people below them in the system. Because there are hazards to bearing bad news, lower-ranking people tend to censor information flowing upward so that it has a positive flavor. Because of the complexity of their work and the public visibility of controversial events, higher-ranking people naturally prefer good news. Thus, an unwitting collusion develops between higher- and lower-ranking people, which tends to keep higher-ranking people better informed about good news than about bad.

People in the *middle* of the organization have the task of holding the organization together in an uneasy alliance between the highest- and lowest-ranking members. They are truly people in the middle. They are more in touch with the concrete day-to-day events than those above them, and they have more power, authority, and autonomy than those below them. They are aware of the tensions and pressures faced by those at the top, and they can be conscious of the deprivations and struggles faced by those below them. They must exercise some control over those below them in the system, and they must satisfy those above them if they are to retain their positions.

The middle holds the system together by dispensing rewards and punishment downward and by exchanging information upward. They send information upward on the basis of judgments of what serves the joint needs of upper and middle people. The exercise of control is a balancing process: too much restriction foment rebellion, and too little permits chaos. The balance of rewards and punishments depends on the quality of interaction between middle and lower people. The more the affective balance is positive, the more rewards are used to influence behavior (and conversely). The more the affective balance is negative, the more punishments are used to shape behavior (and conversely).

People at the *bottom* of the system execute the concrete work for which the system was created. In terms of material needs and formal influence, they are the most

deprived (Argyris 1957). They have fewer material resources, and, as individuals working alone, wield less power than any other class of individuals in the system. There is a sense of anonymity about being at the bottom of large systems—a consequence that encourages people to lose their individuality in groups and not to feel responsible for their actions.

The people at the bottom of the system cope with their relative deprivation and alienation by both passive and aggressive means. When times are "calm," they withhold some of their potential involvement in objectives set for them by middles in order to retain a modicum of control over their lives. They may also covertly undermine vulnerable parts of the larger system. When times are "turbulent," they organize and openly resist initiatives and structures set out by the middles (Brown 1978). A portion of the lower group also identifies with the middle and upper groups: they are most susceptible to the rewards and punishments offered by the middle, and they often share and support the control of their "peers" by the middle group (Bettelheim 1960).

No one who belongs to an organization escapes the effects of hierarchy. Finer differentiations than the three offered here (e.g., upper upper, lower middle, etc.) can be made, but the same basic structure will be repeated within the microcosm of finer distinctions. The effects of hierarchy are "system" characteristics: anyone occupying a particular position in the hierarchy will tend to show the traits associated with that level.

Figure 13.3 provides a schematic to show the intersection of identity and organization groups. There is an inevitable tension between the two classes of groups as long as there are systematic processes that allocate people to organization groups as a function of their identity groups. Sometimes these processes are called "institutional discrimination." (Thought question: how many 30-year-old-[age group too young] Greek [ethnic group nondominant] women do you know of who are presidents of major corporations?) There is usually enough tension among organization groups to occupy the emotional energies of the top group, who have the task of managing group boundaries and transactions. Thus, unless there are special forces to strengthen the boundaries of identity groups within organizations (i.e., give them more authority), the inclination of those in senior positions will be to manage only in terms of organization groups. The manner in which an organization is embedded in its environment and the relations among identity groups in that environment will affect the degree to which management processes respond to identity and organization groups or just to organization groups.

A *Time* magazine article described IBM as "the colossus that works" (Greenwald 1983). With profits of




Figure 13.3 Identity and organization groups

\$4.4 billion on sales of \$34.4 billion, the corporation was called the most profitable U.S. industrial company. This assessment can be only in terms of the values of organization groups. Late in the article, the writer notes, "Despite increased efforts to recruit women and minorities, there are still few of either in management ranks. Only 3,089 of IBM's more-than-29,000 managers are women." Numbers are not mentioned at all for minority-group members. If identity-group values were considered relevant to *Time's* assessment of IBM, whether the "colossus . . . works" would be far more conditional. They might say the corporation is effective in satisfying investors and energetic employees who accept the corporate culture and perform (conform) well according to IBM's special set of values.

Embedded-intergroup relations

Any intergroup relationship occurs within an environment shaped by the suprasystem in which it is embedded. In observing an intergroup relationship one has several perspectives.

1. The effects on individuals who represent the groups in relation to one another
2. The consequences for subgroups within groups as the groups deal with one another
3. The outcomes for groups as a whole when they relate to significant other groups
4. The impact of suprasystem forces on the intergroup relationship in question

Regardless of which level one observes, the phenomenon of "interpenetration" among levels will be operating. Individuals carry images of their own and other groups as they serve in representational roles (Berg 1978; Wells 1980). Subgroup splits within face-to-face groups reflect differing degrees of identification and involvement with the group itself, which are in turn shaped by the relationship of the group as a whole to other groups. Then the group as a whole develops a sense—which may be more or less unconscious—of how its interests are cared for or abused by the suprasystem. The concept of embedded-intergroup relations applies to both identity and task groups (Alderfer and Smith 1982).

Figure 13.4 provides a diagram to illustrate how to think about embedded-intergroup relations from a system's perspective. The picture shows how to construct an embedded-intergroup analysis from an understanding of a particular group's place in a given social system. As group members look toward the suprasystem, they make assessments as to whether their own or another group is in control of distributing scarce resources. When one's own group is in charge or has significant influence, the situation is less hazardous than when the other group dominates. The effects of one's own group's occupying a favorable position in a system may be muted by its being at a relative disadvantage in the suprasystem (Alderfer and Smith 1982).

In the particular example shown in figure 13.4, the relationship is between two task groups, sales and engineering. Both groups do work that is essential for their corporation and, since they are "functional" groups,




Figure 13.5 shows how intergroup dynamics might be exhibited in the dynamics within a ten-person work

white
black
white
black
white
black
white
black
white
black

In earlier sections I discussed transference and countertransference phenomena, mainly as these processes have been observed in psychotherapeutic situations and almost exclusively as they have been applied in one-to-one relationships. Previous examples have also included concrete illustrations from the lives of social researchers




Figure 13.5 Intergroup dynamics embedded in a small group

in which unexamined aspects of these people's lives have apparently shaped their work in ways that seem both meaningful and unrecognized by the authors. I have suggested, but not actually proposed, that these processes have both individual- and group-level components. The terms "parallel process" and "unconscious process" signify concepts for dealing with the somewhat puzzling, and often overlooked, processes whereby two or more human systems in relationship to one another seem to "infect" and become "infected" by one another.

The basic proposition concerning parallel processes is that the dynamics of a system tend to reflect processes in the suprasystem and in its subsystems. Therefore, a system can face reinforcing or conflictual pressures as the outside affects the inside, and the inside, in turn, affects the outside.⁶

From the group-level perspective, parallel processes refer to the ways in which group representatives (i.e., individual people) or groups as a whole having significant and changing relationships tend toward showing similar affect, behavior, and cognition. The primary mechanism by which parallel processes occur is generally emotional and frequently involves unconscious processes at both individual and group levels. Conventionally defined transferential and countertransferential processes between two individuals are special cases of parallel processes at the individual and interpersonal levels. When a therapist begins to show reactions to a patient as a result of unconscious dynamics set off in the therapist, the process is termed "countertransference" (Searles 1955). When a patient begins to show similar reactions to a therapist as a result of unconscious reactions set off in the patient, the process is termed "transference." At the group level, analogous phenomena occur. After interaction between groups, members may find that their characteristic pattern of roles and subgroups change to reflect the roles and subgroups of the group with whom they were relating.

An organizational diagnosis team had assigned its members to each of five departments in a small manufacturing company. Members of the team had interviewed each department head and several department members. They had also observed department meetings. The team was preparing to observe their first meeting of department heads and were trying to anticipate the group's behavior in advance. At first they seemed to have no "rational" basis for predicting the top group's behavior because they "had no data" from direct observation. Their

interview questions had not asked about department head meetings. Reasoning from the theory of parallel processes, they decided to role play the group meeting they had never seen. Diagnostic team members behaved as they thought the department heads would, and the result was almost uncanny. Team members found that they easily became engaged with one another in the simulated department-head meeting; emotional involvement occurred quickly for all participants. When the team actually was able to observe a department-head meeting, they were amazed at how closely the simulated meeting had approximated the actual session.

When parallel processes are set in motion from inside to outside, the unit in the dominant position is engaged in some sort of projection. Accordingly, the process-dominant (i.e., the inside) unit acts toward the other unit as if it were some part of itself, and the other unit responds as if it were indeed that part. The benefit to the sending unit of this happening is that it can release troublesome emotions to another unit. When parallel processes are set in motion from outside to inside, the unit with the submissive process is engaged in some sort of absorption. Accordingly, the process-submissive (i.e., the inside) unit reacts to the other unit as if it were a part of its own, and accepts the offered conditions. The benefit to the receiving unit of this happening is that it can avoid having to differentiate itself from its outside environment.

Without reference to content or purpose, parallel processes may be constructive or destructive. For the purposes of diagnosis, for example, it may be advantageous for a diagnosing unit (person or group) to absorb temporarily a client's condition. For the purposes of change, it may be beneficial for a more optimally functioning system to project its condition onto a related unit. Constructive absorption of parallel processes may be aided by the submissive system's taking an empathic and receptive attitude. Destructive absorption of parallel processes may occur when the submissive system fails to maintain adequate control over its own boundary. Constructive projection of parallel processes may occur when a system with substantial awareness of its own and other system dynamics consciously plans to effect the relationship between the parties for the benefit of both parties and with the conscious consent of the other party. Destructive projection of parallel processes may occur when a system with limited awareness of its own internal dynamics begins to attribute these characteristics to others in order to damage or destroy them (see Alderfer 1981; Alderfer et al. 1984).

Understanding parallel processes requires a willingness to contend explicitly with emotional reactions—both one's own and others'. Included among the emo-

6. To be able to observe parallel processes takes special training and may not be accessible to everyone even with training (see Alderfer et al. 1984 for a review of the literature identifying parallel processes and for detailed studies documenting the phenomenon).

tional reactions are conscious and unconscious processes that may occur at both individual and group levels. Inevitably any direct dealing with the range of emotions characteristic of parallel processes involves being disturbed and giving up some degree of control. To accept parallel processes as phenomena worthy of attention is to be willing to face anxiety and uncertainty.

The mechanisms by which parallel processes may be altered differ for the projective and the absorptive positions.

1. Projective mechanisms are reduced when the origins—whether individual or group—own, rather than share, responsibility for what is happening. Concretely, at the individual level, this means making "I" statements such as, "I was feeling nervous when . . ." The analogue at the group level is "we" statements pertaining to characteristics of a group in which the speaker acknowledges membership.

2. Absorptive mechanisms are reduced when the targets raise questions about why particular messages are being sent to them as they are. The question identifies the parallel process and inquires about its meaning or purpose. For example, "I wonder why members of the red group treat members of the green group as if we are untrustworthy."

Parallel processes are dynamic rather than static. They may affect relationships across levels of analysis (individual to group; group to organization) and between comparable units (individual to individual; group to group). Observation and management of parallel processes provide key avenues for understanding and changing systems from group and individual levels. Thus, parallel processes are not only phenomena that investigators observe in systems they attempt to understand and change, but they are also dynamics that play out in the lives of investigators as they do their work. The behavioral aspects of methodology become the means by which researchers actively engage, or unwittingly suppress, the parallel processes set off by their activities (Alderfer and Smith 1982).

APPLICATION OF THE INTERGROUP THEORY TO SELECTED PROBLEMS

As a general perspective on group behavior in organizations, the intergroup theory may be used to address a

variety of human problems. In this concluding section, I shall discuss what the theory has to say about four problems that face organizational psychologists. The list of problems is short and by no means exhaustive; particular problems vary in the degree to which "the problem" is conceptional (i.e., developing a more fruitful way of thinking) or practical (i.e., establishing a more useful way of acting). I selected each of the problems because it has been a subject of my attention during the last several years. The problems are.

1. developing effective teams;
2. understanding organizational culture;
3. responding to minorities and white women in predominantly white male organizations;
4. teaching organizational behavior in management schools.

Developing effective teams

For purposes of this work, a team is an officially sanctioned collection of individuals who have been charged with completing a mission by an organization and who must depend upon one another for successful completion of that work. The life of the team may be finite (e.g., a task force with a particular due date for its product) or infinite (e.g., a top-management group). According to the concept of group given above, a team so defined is also a group.

Traditionally "team building," as the social technology is usually called, has focused inward toward the interpersonal relationships among team members. The question is what difference, if any, the intergroup theory would make to conventional team building. Suggestive answers can be formed in two of the earliest reports on team building interventions.

In *Money and Motivation*, Whyte (1955a, 90-96) reports one of the earliest experiments in team building among hourly workers that failed because "it succeeded too well." The target for change was a group of "girls" who operated along an assembly line that produced wooden toys. The external consultant was a male as was the women's foreman.⁷ Changes were brought about by the consultant's talking with the foreman, who in turn consulted with his subordinates and other key people in the system. Especially significant seemed to be the foreman's recognition of and working with the "informal leader" of the women's group. As a result of these consultations two sociotechnical innovations were introduced within the work group. First, the women asked

7. In this case Whyte himself was not the consultant.

to improve the condition of the air in the setting where they worked. After much talk and considerable hesitation by management, they were given two fans. The work group as a whole decided how to locate the fans. Once the group had satisfied itself about the location, their morale increased dramatically. Second, they asked for and received—again, with great reluctance, this time from the quality control engineers and senior management—the right to control the pace of their assembly line. Again, there was a period of testing, but eventually the group established a pattern to their liking. After the changes were made, notable productivity gains were realized. The average pace of the line set by the team was higher than the rate originally established by the plant engineers. The team was paid on a group piece rate incentive, so they benefited financially from the productivity gains. Rationally, one might think that the program was a great success for the employees and for the factory.

In fact, the experiment was unilaterally discontinued by the foreman's boss. The work group's success apparently was very disturbing to several other groups in the organization. Similar work teams were bothered by the experimental team's autonomy and income. The work-study engineers were embarrassed by their exceeding the predicted production rates. Senior management was upset by the range and intensity of the complaints they received. Thus, the "successful" innovation was terminated. Within several months, most of the original team members and the foreman left the group in order to find work elsewhere.

In *Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness*, Argyris (1962) reports one of the earliest experiments in team building among senior managers.⁸ The consulting program brought about changes within the group that received consultation, but eventually these changes eroded because the intervention failed to alter significantly the relationships of these men to others in their organization. The chief problems that face senior management groups differ from those encountered at lower levels in the organization. Argyris's (1962) executives acted to suppress emotions in their dealings with each other, demonstrated an inability to listen receptively, and withheld information relevant to interdependent tasks.

The intervention with the all-male group included on-site interviews coupled with observations, a feedback meeting giving the group a diagnosis of its interpersonal patterns, an intensive off-site T-group workshop, and follow-up sessions to assess the impact of these activities. Roger Harrison (1962) conducted an independent assessment of the program using different methods than

Argyris: Harrison's findings were mainly congruent with Argyris's own evaluation.

Despite major differences in method and minor differences in theory, both researchers found that the executives who took the program reported and demonstrated substantial and significant changes in their perceptions of each other. Argyris also found behavior changes among the executives who had participated in the off-site workshop. Harrison found that the executives changed their perceptions only of those individuals who also attended the workshop. Both investigators explain the limited efforts of the change as arising from counterforces in the organization. The exact words used by Argyris (1962, 247) were, "... The biggest difficulties encountered by the experimental group was [sic] in their relationship with their peers (who had not attended the laboratory) and subordinates (who also had not attended the laboratory) as well as the pressures from 'above' and 'outside.'" Furthermore Argyris reported a dampening of the effects of the program as time passed, even for those who attended the off-site sessions.

Both the Whyte and the Argyris interventions show an awareness of external group forces acting on their innovative groups. In Whyte's case, the forces came from individual engineers, higher-level management, and other work groups. In Argyris's case, the forces came from other groups of managers above, below, and beside the target group. For Whyte's group the innovation was ended by a single spectacular action taken by senior management. For Argyris's group, the gains of the intervention were slowly and subtly eroded by interactions with individuals representing groups who had not participated in the intervention program. From my perspective, the difficulties with both interventions call out for intergroup interpretation. Both programs had intergroup data from the outset, gave primary attention to intra-group events during the intervention period, and then encountered difficulties that can be explained readily by the operation of intergroup dynamics.

Both the Whyte and the Argyris reports were pioneering efforts carried out before the technology and theory of applied behavioral science were as well developed as they are today. The question naturally arises as to whether recent technology and theory of team development has begun to take more complete account of intergroup forces. In a book summarizing the social technology of team building, Dyer (1977) wrote 139 pages; of those, six were devoted to reducing inter-team conflict, the only portion of the book explicitly addressing intergroup dynamics. In that section, he gives five different "inter-team" designs. All these approaches deal only with the external boundaries between interdependent groups. None considers the effects of individuals within a group serving as group representatives (such as

8. In this case Argyris was a consultant to the group.

the effects of a single male in an all-female group) or of the larger organization context consisting of many identity and organization groups. His work shows no awareness of embedded-intergroup relations. In short, Dyer's review and summary of team development shows little more awareness of intergroup concepts or intergroup intervention than the original work by Whyte and Argyris. An alternative view may be found in Alderfer and Brown (1975), which reports the failure of a team-development effort that initially relied only on intragroup concepts followed by success in the same system with the same group after the theory and method were changed to include intergroup concepts and technology.

Alderfer and Brown (1975) faced the difficulties of an exclusively intragroup orientation from the outset of the intervention. Unlike the projects described by Whyte and Argyris, they were not permitted to start without taking account of the other groups in the system. Originally, the target for their efforts was the group of senior student leaders in a boarding school who had responsibilities for managing dormitory life. When initially invited to participate in an intervention, the students resisted because they viewed the consultation as an effort sponsored by the school administration to control them. Later, when the intervention design was altered to include faculty and students who had dormitory responsibilities, both groups responded enthusiastically to the invitation to participate.

In general, the problem of managing the intergroup relations of several identity and organization groups who may have an interest in a team-development intervention can be addressed by creating a microcosm group of representatives from the interested units (Alderfer 1977b; Alderfer et al. 1980; Alderfer 1981; Alderfer and Smith 1982).

Understanding organizational culture

As investigators and consultants have shifted their concerns from small groups to the organization as a whole, there has been a corresponding search for concepts that offer the possibility of giving a holistic formulation to the total system. The notion of an organizational culture has, in part, emerged from this quest.⁹ From the standpoint of this paper, the key question is What sort of intellectual conversation might occur between the theorist of organizational culture and the intergroup theorist? As a response to this question I examine the work of Schein (1983a) and of Martin and Siehl (1982).

Schein's analysis is especially useful because he approaches the concept of organizational culture from the standpoint of group dynamics and learning theory. He provides a formal definition of culture, as follows:

Organizational culture is the *pattern of basic assumptions* which a given group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which have worked well enough to be considered valid, and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.

Schein's view of culture is that, "there cannot be any culture unless there is a group which 'owns' it. Culture is created by groups, hence the creating group must always be clearly identified." In his conceptual work, Schein is mainly associating organizational culture with a single group, but there is also a sense that he is not quite sure that it is one group; he said, "Culture is created by groups" (plural). Yet the main focus of his attention is on a group—the set of individuals who work with the founder to establish the organization (Schein 1983b). However, even within that orientation, Schein's empirical work describing three different founder cultures indirectly reports intergroup phenomena. One of the three founders he describes in detail established a family business that included nonfamily members in the founder's group. As it turned out, the behavior of the founder was different toward nonfamily members than toward family members. Family members received stock options, easy access to developmental assignments, and ready excuses for errors—none of which were available to nonfamily members. As a result "subcultures" formed around "groups of younger managers who were . . . insulated from the founder" (Schein 1983a).

Martin and Siehl (1982) also use the concept of subculture. In their case, they propose the notion of a "counterculture" formed around a charismatic figure who provides a sensitively balanced set of assumptions and behaviors that offer an alternative to the dominant culture. Their empirical material is drawn from the activities of John DeLorean when he was a senior executive with General Motors.

The notion of subcultures, of course, suggests an intergroup perspective, but it does not explicitly propose that view. Rather the term *subculture* implies that the diversity of cultures is really *subordinate* to the main culture, or perhaps, that subculture is the theorist's way of accommodating to data that are obviously present but do not quite fit a "one-group" view of cultural dynamics. What if the idea of organizational culture were viewed as a multiple-group phenomenon?

⁹ The concept of organizational culture serves other functions as well, and not all organizational culture researchers are concerned with viewing organizations holistically.

A study by McCollom (1983) provides data that were gathered and analyzed from a multiple-group perspective. Her work is especially interesting because she initially expected to find a single culture but emerged from her research to write about the cultures of the BCD School. Her own words state,

I began this study expecting to be able to identify a culture which typified BCD. Instead, I found a number of distinct subcultures residing in the major groups in the School (students, faculty, and staff). The interaction of these cultures seemed to produce an organizational culture that was far from homogeneous. In fact, conflict between the groups seemed to become part of the culture of the whole system (e.g., the generally held expectation that staff and faculty would disagree). My hypothesis is that the relative power of each of the groups over time in the organization is a major factor in determining the culture.

This statement exemplifies an intergroup view of organizational culture. It makes the culture of the whole system a product of the cultures of key groups in the system *in interaction with one another*. In McCollom's study the predominant pattern of interaction between at least two of these groups was conflictual. Conflict, however, need not be the major style of intergroup transaction for the organization culture to be usefully conceptualized as dynamic intergroup pattern.

An important difference between the work of McCollom and that of Schein (1983a) and Martin and Siehl (1982) may be their own roles and group memberships in relation to the cultures they described. Schein was an outsider with direct access (perhaps as a consultant?) to his founders and their groups. Martin and Siehl were outsiders who read published materials about GM and DeLorean and who interviewed people who had been close to the scene. McCollom was a member of the organization she studied and was committed to examining the perspectives her group memberships gave her on the system she studied. It is likely that Schein and Martin and Siehl were prevented from fully seeing the multiple-group qualities of the organizations they studied, because they permitted themselves to become mainly associated with just one group. I suggest again that the intergroup relationships of investigators and how those relationships are managed are likely to shape the data they obtain and the concepts derived from those findings.

Responding to white women and minorities in predominantly white male organizations

Speaking before the American Bar Association on August 1, 1983, the president of the United States said,

We aim for a cross-section of appointments that fully reflects the rich diversity and talent of our people. But we do not, and we will never, select individuals just because they are men or women, whites or blacks, Jews, Catholics or whatever. I don't look at people as members of groups. I look at them as individuals and as Americans. I believe you rob people of their dignity and confidence when you impose quotas. The implicit, but false, message of quotas is that some people can't make it under the same rules that apply to everyone else. . . .

When an opening appeared on this nation's highest court, I selected the person I believed the most outstanding candidate. I'm proud that, for the first time in our history, a woman, named Sandra Day O'Connor, now sits on the Supreme Court of the United States. But I am proudest of this appointment, not because Justice O'Connor is a woman, but because she is so well qualified.

We are committed to appointing outstanding blacks, Hispanics and women to judicial and top level policy-making positions in our administration. Three women are members of my Cabinet. . . .¹⁰

The president shows in this speech that he consciously holds the individual *versus* group view of intergroup dynamics. Yet careful observation of his words suggests a more complex picture. "We are committed to appointing outstanding blacks, Hispanics and women . . ." is a statement that suggests that blacks and Hispanics are not women or that women are not black or Hispanic. The statement could also imply that the adjective "outstanding" applies in his thinking only to blacks, Hispanics, and women. Applying a kind of tough-minded logic to the president's words, one could deduce that people who are not black, Hispanic, or women might not be subject to the criterion of "outstanding" when considered for appointments. All of this is to suggest that the president is using group-level concepts perhaps more than he understands or acknowledges.

There is a variety of ways that his statement could be rewritten to make the implicit group concepts more explicit. But to clarify what he meant requires the addition of at least two more group identifications—white and male. The president himself is a white man; the senior people in his administration are primarily white men; and a basis on which listing blacks, Hispanics, and women in a series makes sense is if they are to be contrasted (implicitly) with white men. So perhaps the more precise—though possibly more politically volatile—form of the statement is, "We are committed to appointing outstanding blacks, Hispanics, and white women. . . ."

10. Excerpts from President's Address to American Bar Association, *New York Times*, 2 August 1983. Copyright © 1983 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

Sandra Day O'Connor and the three cabinet-level people he alludes to are *white women*. With such a change, the terms "black" and "Hispanic" would less ambiguously imply black men and women and Hispanic men and women. However, it is also not completely clear that the president means to appoint Hispanic and black women to senior positions.

The president says he does not look at people as members of groups but as individuals and as *Americans*. Being an American is usually thought of as being a member of a national group. Here again the president gives a conflicted message about whether he prefers to look at people solely as individuals or as individuals and as members of some groups. The president is also reasonably well known for wishing to distinguish between Republicans and Democrats.

Finally there are his words about quotas: "The implicit, but false, message of quotas is that some people can't make it under the same rules that apply to everyone else. . . ." I believe the president had a particular kind of quota in mind when he made that assertion. He probably meant quotas in the form of affirmative-action targets such that by a particular date there will be a specific number of white women, Hispanics, blacks, Asian-Pacific Islanders, native American Indians in positions formerly held only by white men. But quotas as goals are not the only form of quotas that have operated, and continue to operate, in the United States. There are also quotas such as restrictions that a private club shall have no black members. Viewing quotas from the perspective of restrictions, review the president's words: "The implicit, but false, message of quotas is that some people can't make it under the same rules that apply to everyone else. . . ." The message of restrictive quotas is exactly that: some groups of people do not make it under the same rules that apply to white men.

The point of this detailed examination of the president's words is mainly to view them as statements by a group representative. We select the president of the United States as our primary national-group representative. As it turns out, the history of the United States is that only white men have been elected to that office, and for a significant proportion of our history, only white men were permitted to vote for people to serve in that office. Because the president is our national group spokesperson, his words not only can, but should, be taken to reflect the views of the country as a whole. The complex mix of assertions and denials, of rejecting and accepting the use of group and individual concepts, is deeply established in our national unconscious.

The president's formulation, therefore, is not his alone. He speaks from the group perspective of the

United States. But perhaps more accurately, he speaks for older white men who hold senior positions in large organizations. The president's words in all their nuance are understandable as coming from a political leader reflecting the coalition that brought him to office. The failure to acknowledge white men as a group, the omission of "white" from the identification of his most senior women, and the ambiguity about whether black and Hispanic include men and women are elements of a larger pattern characteristic of white men as a group (Alderfer et al. 1983).

These sorts of considerations become part of the analytic framework when intergroup theory is used to understand and to act in relation to what are today called "affirmative action issues." In fact, the words *affirmative action*, even though they were created by a political administration whose ideology was different from that of the current administration, have considerable latent textual ambiguity. The converse of the two words taken together is *passive inaction*, which is so often what affirmative action becomes in practice, because the administrative systems that have the power to carry out the policy are in charge of senior white men whose theory in practice is very similar to the president's.

An intergroup perspective on affirmative action notably heightens the complexity of thinking and of action. Perhaps the beginning is to recognize and to accept that a white male is not only an individual but also a group condition (see figure 13.2). The term *affirmative action* interpreted progressively means recognizing and changing the exclusively white-male domination of a large proportion of U.S. institutions. Acknowledging only the individual differences among white men (or any other group) and denying the group effects seriously limits what can be understood and what can be done. These limits often serve the material interests of certain groups and individuals—perhaps especially white men but also individual white women and individual members of minority groups who unconsciously or consciously have decided to cope with their group's position by using white men as models (see Davis and Watson 1982; Davis 1983; Joseph and Lewis 1981).

However, once one begins to take a multiple group perspective, the answers do not come easily nor do the actions become obvious. In fact, there is probably an increase in group-level psychic pain associated with an increase in consciousness about both the historical and contemporary relations of one's own group to other groups. For some, there may be a wish that all oppressed groups can unite in challenging the oppressor group of white males. But then new awareness develops. An historical examination of the relation between white women and blacks reveals some periods of serious cooper-

Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page, including "JAN 1984" and "JAN 1984" with a signature.

ation and also many evidences of deep-seated racism in the (white) women's movement (Joseph and Lewis 1981; Davis 1983). History also includes episodes when black men spoke against immediately developing voting rights for women (Davis 1983). Contemporary research shows evidence of black women ready to capitalize on the difficulties of black men in order to advance in predominantly white male corporate cultures (Davis and Watson 1982) and of white women in totally female interracial organizations apparently oblivious to racial dynamics unless directly confronted with the issues (Van Steenberg 1983).

I began this section with a detailed examination of a statement by the president of the United States. He is a white male, as am I. Intergroup theory applied normatively indicates that a group can begin to reverse destructive parallel processes based on projection by questioning and examining itself. The process of scrutinizing one's own group represents the first step in a process that can lead to cross-group interaction and intergroup cooperation. Beginning with an analysis of one's group and returning periodically to such work can provide a basis for seeing realistic differences in priorities among groups and for discovering sound bases for cooperation (see Alderfer et al. [1980] for the description of such a process applied to race relations in management).

Teaching organizational behavior in management schools

At one time there was a single normative model of the learning-teaching process, which had roughly the following form:

One began with *the material* to be learned. Usually this had the form of a mix of abstract generalizations and concrete applications. In some settings, such as professional schools, the material also included knowledge not only of how to think but also of how to act. In addition to the material, the normative model included two other components: the teacher who had access to the material and the student who did not, at least initially. The task of the teacher was to transfer the material from wherever it was (e.g., in her or his mind, in lecture notes, in books, in cases) into the minds of students. The task of the student was to absorb the material. The learning-teaching process succeeded to the degree that the teacher was able to transfer and the student was able to absorb the material.

I believe this normative model was both correct as far as it went and extraordinarily limited, especially when the material is human behavior in organizations.

In the history of teacher education there has been a long-standing tension between people who gave primary (or exclusive) attention to the material versus those who gave primary (or exclusive) attention to the transfer (Sarason, Davidson, and Blatt 1962). I believe the normative model was correct because its fundamental elements were sound, and it was limited because it failed to deal adequately with the great variety of transfer and absorption processes or with the complex interactions between different kinds of material and alternative transfer and absorption processes. The tension between those who emphasize the material versus those who emphasize the transfer is made more understandable if one assumes that the underlying functional relationship is interactive (i.e., multiplicative); it takes *both* knowledge of the material and of transfer-absorption processes to effect learning-teaching. Tension arises because individuals and groups have difficulty holding such tensions; they find a certain degree of relief from their own anxiety if they can escape from one aspect of the conflict. Choosing to emphasize either knowledge of the material or of transfer-absorption processes provides at least short-term relief.

When the material is organizational behavior, interactions between the material and transfer-absorption processes have special qualities because every learning-teaching event is also a concrete here-and-now event in the organizational lives of teachers and students. Organizational behavior teachers vary substantially in the degree to which they show awareness of this property and of how they take account of it, should they be aware of it (see Bradford, Benne, and Chin 1964; Rice 1965; Alderfer 1970a; Gillette and Van Steenberg 1983; issues of *Exchange: The Organizational Behavior Teaching Journal* 1975-83).

Intergroup theory treats the classroom as an organization embedded in larger suprasystems (i.e., the school and the university). Teachers represent their organizational groups by rank and discipline and their identity groups. Students represent their organizational groups by seniority (year in program) and position in the university (program member versus non-program member) and their identity groups. Classrooms usually include intergroup transactions among organization groups of students (e.g., first- and second-year students) and among identity groups of students (e.g., men and women) and between teachers and students. When faculty work as teams within a classroom or by having several sections of large courses, then complex interactions among organization and identity groups develop and exert powerful effects on the learning-teaching process.

An especially lucid case of the interaction between organization groups of faculty and students has been reported by Cohen and Miaoulis (1978). They describe

They (the students) look at your clothes because they know that is what you chose to put on to present your-

U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE
BUREAU OF PLANT INDUSTRY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
1914

Autumn

self to them. I do not know about you, but the first day I go to class. I have a strategy. Remember, it's Interpersonal Behavior but I dress like I was going down to do some consulting at McKinsey in New York City. I have a suit I used to wear to do that—I bought it for that purpose. It is dark gray. It's a business suit and I walk in dressed like a businessman. I do not come in dressed like a professor. I do that from my understanding of where they are coming from out of the first year and what they think about soft Organizational Behavior-type courses. I want the first day so organized so that they see a lot of the instrumental side of me.

An intergroup interpretation of Athos's strategy suggests that he expects to be the object of an ethnocentric reaction by the students—a soft organizational behavior professor. By his clothes he attempts to join another group—(presumably) hard McKinsey consultants. One can wonder what Athos's response would be if faced with student questions such as, "Professor Athos, why do you dress like a McKinsey consultant? Is it because you belong to that group? [I thought you were mainly a professor.] Is it because you represent the McKinsey group's values and concepts? [I have never thought of McKinsey as especially progressive in its understanding of human behavior.]" Intergroup theory also predicts that it is extremely unlikely that Athos would be asked these questions on the first day of class, which is not to say students would overlook his dress. How they would interpret that observation depends on how they relate their own groups to Athos. If he is correct, the most straightforward prediction (at least for the male students) is that they would infer, "He is a member of our group in good standing; he will not be disruptive to our existing ways of thinking and acting; it will be a comfortable and cohesive class among us McKinsey people." Perhaps that is what Athos wants.

Then again, it may not be quite, or even mainly, what Athos wants. The article from which I quoted was published in the organizational behavior teaching journal. Thus, there are clearly circumstances under which Athos is willing to acknowledge his membership as an organizational behavior professor. Perhaps the explanatory process is less Athos's relationship to his own group of organizational behavior teachers and more the relationship of his group to the suprasystem in which it is embedded. Roethlisberger's (1977) autobiography provides a detailed account of the difficulties and struggles encountered by the organizational behavior group at the Harvard Business School, which is where Athos was teaching when he wrote the article. Beyond the special circumstances of Harvard, however, there is also evidence that organizational behavior groups in general face difficulties within the context of schools of business (Fil-

ley, Foster, and Herbert 1979). Another intergroup interpretation of Athos's preparation for his first day in class is that it reflected his attempt to cope with systemic processes that reject and depotentiate his group. His own words say, "I do that from my understanding of where they are coming from . . . and what they think about soft Organizational Behavior-type courses. . . ." Intergroup theory applied to the problem of OB groups facing intellectual ideologies that wish to deny the existence of behavioral phenomena—especially feelings—does not support denying one's own group membership or the group's potential for making a unique contribution to management-school culture. Doing that colludes with destructive parallel processes whose unconscious (and sometimes conscious) aim is to prevent managers and management teachers from having to face the difficult emotional and behavioral issues characteristic of complex organizations.

The alternatives offered by intergroup theory are either to invite the students to give their perceptions (rather than operating on inferences) and thereby own up to whatever they think and feel or to have the instructor own up to his behavior and beliefs rather than dealing with his group membership covertly by dressing to disown his OB-faculty group membership. Learning and teaching about the nonrational side of organizations is one major reason why organizational behavior groups exist. When organizational behavior professors act like McKinsey consultants, we provide support to groups who argue that OB does not have a novel and worthwhile contribution to make to management education. The alternative is to be clear about one's group boundaries and group membership in the classroom and in embedded disciplinary group negotiations, and from that clarity to demonstrate in here-and-now events that organizational behavior contributes uniquely from its own methods and theories to the overall multidisciplinary culture of management education.

Intergroup theory applied to teaching organizational behavior in management schools modifies the normative model of learning-teaching.

One begins with the material, which is constantly being enacted among organization and identity groups of students and faculty. Abstract generalizations and concrete applications about the material become part of the cognitive formations that student and faculty groups develop as a function of their power differences and affective patterns in order to explain the nature of experiences encountered by group members and to influence relations with other groups. The degree of change in cognitive formations for individuals depends upon their intrapsychic conditions, their relations with members of their own groups, and the relations between

their groups and other interdependent groups in the system in which they are embedded.

CONCLUSION

Intergroup perspectives began to shape the understanding of human behavior from the beginning of the twentieth century. Scholars reflecting upon such diverse events as political revolution, tribal warfare, labor-management relations, and mental illness showed an awareness of group-to-group relations in their thinking and action. In the last thirty years, numerous intergroup theories have evolved and shaped methodological traditions. Currently, these theory-method combinations can be distinguished by their relative focus on group-level concepts, attention to groups in context or in isolation, acceptance of interventionist behavior by researchers, and tendency toward examining the individual and group behavior of investigators.

Intergroup theory provides interpretations for individual, interpersonal, group, intergroup, and organizational relations. The version of intergroup theory given here uses a definition of group that is concerned with both internal and external properties. It explains intergroup dynamics in terms of group boundaries, power, affect, cognition, and leadership behavior. It examines the nature of identity and organization groups. It relates the state of intergroup relations to the suprasystem in which they are embedded. It presents an understanding of the changing relations among interdependent groups and their representatives through the operation of parallel and unconscious processes.

The theory relates to a wide array of social and organizational problems, including the development of effective work teams, the definition and management of organizational culture, the analysis and implementation of affirmative action, and the teaching of organizational behavior in management schools.

The most important implication of intergroup theory may be the reorientation it offers to those who study and teach about human behavior in groups and organizations. Mannheim was among the most prominent of twentieth-century scholars who connected the sociology of knowledge with the group memberships of writers.

Accordingly, the products of the cognitive process are already . . . differentiated because not every possible aspect of the world comes within the purview of the members of a group, but only those out of which difficulties and problems for the group arise. And even this common world (not shared by any outside groups in the same way) appears differently to subordinate groups within the larger group. It appears differently because the subordinate groups and strata in a functionally differentiated society have a different experiential approach. . . . (Mannheim 1936, 29).

Intergroup theory proposes that both organization groups (e.g., being a researcher versus being a respondent) and identity groups (e.g., being a person of particular gender, age, ethnicity and family) affect one's intergroup relations and thereby shape one's cognitive formations. The body of data supporting this general proposition grows as changes in society broaden the range of identity groups with access to research roles (see Balmary 1981; Eagly and Carli 1981; Herman 1981), and consequently the content of "well-established" empirical generalizations and conceptual frameworks are called into question. These new developments affect research and development as well as clinical methods. None of the accepted methods in their implementation escapes potential intergroup effects between researchers and respondents. Investigators who accept this idea cannot avoid questioning the part they and their groups play in the knowledge-making process. Understanding one's intergroup relationships may become a key ingredient for all who wish to study people effectively.

REFERENCES

- Adams, R. N., and J. J. Preiss. 1960. *Human Organization Research*. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey.
- Adorno, T. W., E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper.
- Agazarian, Y., and R. Peters. 1981. *The Visible and Invisible Group*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Alderfer, C. P. 1970a. "Teaching Organizational Change to 'Insiders and 'Outsiders.'" *Professional Psychology* 1:397-401.
- . 1970b. "Subcultures in Behavioral Science and the Interpretation of Research on Experiential Methods." *Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association* 22:98-108.
- . 1971. "Effect of Individual, Group, and Intergroup Relations on Attitudes toward a Management Development Program." *Journal of Applied Psychology* 55:302-11.
- . 1976. "Change Processes in Organizations." In *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, ed. M. D. Dunnette, pp. 1591-1638. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
- . 1977a. "Group and Intergroup Relations." In *Improving*

- ing *Life at Work*. ed. J. R. Hackman and J. L. Suttle. pp. 227-96. Santa Monica: Goodyear.
- . 1977b. "Improving Organizational Communication through Long-Term, Intergroup Intervention." *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 13:193-210.
- . 1980. "Consulting to Underbounded Systems." In *Advances in Experiential Social Processes*, vol. 2, ed. C. P. Alderfer and C. L. Cooper. pp. 267-95. New York: Wiley.
- . 1981. "Intergroup Relations and Organizational Diagnosis." In *Making Organizations Humane and Productive*, ed. H. Meltzer and W. R. Nord. pp. 355-71. New York: Wiley.
- . 1982. "The Problems of Changing White Males' Belief and Behavior in Race Relations." In *Change in Organizations*, ed. P. Goodman. pp. 122-65. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Alderfer, C. P., C. Alderfer, L. Tucker, and R. C. Tucker. 1980. "Diagnosing Race Relations in Management." *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 16:135-66.
- Alderfer, C. P., and L. D. Brown. 1975. *Learning from Changing*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.
- Alderfer, C. P., L. D. Brown, R. E. Kaplan, and K. K. Smith. 1984. *Group Relations and Organizational Diagnosis*. New York: Wiley.
- Alderfer, C. P., and K. K. Smith. 1982. "Studying Intergroup Relations Embedded in Organizations." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 27:35-65.
- Alderfer, C. P., R. C. Tucker, D. Morgan, and F. Drasgow. 1983. "Black and White Cognitions of Changing Race Relations." *Journal of Occupational Behavior* 4:105-36.
- Allport, F. H. 1924. *Social Psychology*. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
- Allport, G. W. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. New York: Doubleday.
- Anthony, E. J. 1971. "The History of Group Psychotherapy." In *Comprehensive Group Psychotherapy*, ed. H. I. Kaplan and B. J. Sadock. pp. 4-31. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins.
- Argyris, C. 1957. *Personality and Organization*. New York: Harper.
- . 1962. *Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness*. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin.
- Athos, A. G. 1979. "Contingencies Beyond Reasoning." *Exchange* 4:7-12.
- Balmary, M. 1981. *Psychoanalyzing Psychoanalysis*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Berg, D. N. 1978. "Intergroup Relations in Out Patient Psychiatric Facility." Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan.
- . 1980. "Developing Clinical Field Skills: An Apprenticeship Model." In *Advances in Experiential Social Processes*, vol. 2, ed. C. L. Cooper and C. P. Alderfer. pp. 143-64. New York: Wiley.
- . 1984. "Objectivity and Prejudice." *American Behavioral Scientist* (January).
- Bettelheim, B. 1960. *The Informed Heart*. New York: Free Press.
- Billig, M. 1976. *Social Psychology and Intergroup Relations*. London: Academic Press.
- Bion, W. R. 1959. *Experiences in Groups*. New York: Basic Books.
- Blake, R. R., H. A. Shepard, and J. Mouton. 1964. *Managing Intergroup Conflict in Industry*. Houston: Gulf.
- Blalock, H. M., and P. H. Wilken. 1976. *Intergroup Processes*. New York: Free Press.
- Bradford, L., K. Benne, and R. Chin. 1964. *T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method*. New York: Wiley.
- Brewer, M. B., and D. T. Campbell. 1976. *Ethnocentrism and Intergroup Attitudes*. New York: Wiley.
- Brown, L. D. 1978. "Toward a Theory of Power and Intergroup Relations." In *Advances in Experiential Social Processes*, vol. 1, ed. C. L. Cooper and C. P. Alderfer. pp. 161-80. New York: Wiley.
- Brown, R. J., and J. C. Turner. 1981. "Interpersonal and Intergroup Behavior." In *Intergroup Behavior*, ed. J. C. Turner and H. Giles. pp. 33-65. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Caplette, M. 1981. "Women in Publishing: A Study of Careers in Organizations." Ph. D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, SUNY, Stony Brook.
- Cartwright, D., and A. Zander. 1968. *Group Dynamics*. 3d ed. Evanston, Ill.: Row-Peterson.
- Cass, E. L., and F. Zimmer, eds. 1975. *Man and Work in Society*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
- Clark, K. B., and M. P. Clark. 1947. "Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Children." In *Readings in Social Psychology*, 3d ed., ed. E. Maccoby, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Cohen, A. R., and G. Miaoulis. 1978. "MBA Student Anxiety and Overreactions: Learning from Linking the Required OB and Marketing Courses." *Exchange: The Organizational Behavior Teaching Journal* 3, no. 2:11-19.
- Coser, L. A. 1956. *The Functions of Social Conflict*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- . 1984. "The Greedy Nature of *Gemeinschaft*." In *Conflict and Consensus: Essays in Honor of Lewis A. Coser*, ed. W. W. Powell and R. Robbins. New York: Free Press.
- Cooley, C. H. 1929. "Case Study of Small Institutions as a Method of Research." In *Personality and the Social Group*, ed. E. W. Burgess. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Davis, A. Y. 1983. *Women, Race, and Class*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Davis, G., and G. Watson. 1982. *Black Life in Corporate America*. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday.
- Devereux, G. 1967. *From Anxiety to Method in the Behavioral Sciences*. Paris: Mouton.
- . 1968. *Reality and Dream*. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books.
- Dunnette, M. D. 1976. *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
- Dyer, W. G. 1977. *Team Building: Issues and Alternatives*. Menlo Park, Calif.: Addison-Wesley.
- Eagly, A. H., and L. L. Carli. 1981. "Sex of Researchers and Sex-Typed Communications as Determinants of Sex Differ-

- ences in Influenceability: A Meta-Analysis of Social Influence Studies." *Psychological Bulletin* 90:1-20.
- Erikson, E. H. 1964. *Insight and Responsibility*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Excerpts from President's Address to American Bar Association. *New York Times*. 2 August 1983.
- Exchange: *The Organizational Behavior Teaching Journal*. 1975-1983.
- Feurer, L. S. 1969. *The Conflict of the Generations*. New York: Basic Books.
- Filene, P. G. 1974. *Him, Her, Self*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Filley, A. C., L. W. Foster, and T. C. Herbert. 1979. "Teaching Organizational Behavior: Current Patterns and Implications." *Exchange: The Organizational Behavior Teaching Journal* 4:13-21.
- Filstead, W. J., ed. 1970. *Qualitative Methodology*. Chicago: Markham.
- Fiske, E. B. 1983. "Japan's Schools Stress Group and Discourage Individuality." *New York Times*. 11 July.
- Freud, S. 1922. *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. New York: Liveright.
- . 1963. "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (1905)." In *Dora—An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*, ed. P. Reiff. New York: Collier.
- Fromm-Reichmann, F. 1950. *Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gillette, J., and V. Van Steenberg. 1983. A Group-on-Group Design for Teaching Group Dynamics in a Management School Setting. Yale School of Organization and Management Working Paper.
- Glazer, N., and D. P. Moynihan. 1975. *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard.
- Golembiewski, R. T. 1965. "Small Groups and Large Organizations." In *Handbook of Organizations*, ed. J. March, pp. 87-141. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
- Greenwald, J. 1983. "The Colossus that Works." *Time* 122, no. 2:44ff.
- Guzzo, R. A., and G. Epstein. 1979. *Behavioral Issues in Family Businesses: An Annotated Bibliography*. Montreal: School of Management, McGill University.
- Hackman, J. R. 1976. "Group Influences on Individuals." In *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, ed. M. Dunnette, pp. 1455-1526. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
- Harrison, R. 1962. "Impact of the Laboratory on Perceptions of Others by the Experimental Group." In *Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness*, ed. C. Argyris. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press.
- Herman, J. L. 1981. *Father-Daughter Incest*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Joseph, G. I., and J. Lewis. 1981. *Common Differences: Conflicts in Black and White Feminist Perspectives*. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday.
- Jung, C. G. 1946. *The Psychology of the Transference*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Kanter, R. 1977. *Men and Women of the Corporation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Katz, D., and R. L. Kahn. 1978. *The Social Psychology of Organizations*. 2d ed. New York: Wiley.
- Kerner, O. and J. Lindsay. 1968. *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*. New York: Dutton.
- Klein, E. G. 1977. "Transference in Training Groups." *Journal of Personality and Social Systems* 1:53-64.
- Lasswell, H. D., and A. Kaplan. 1950. *Power and Society*. New Haven: Yale.
- Le Bon, G. 1895. *The Crowd*. New York: Macmillan.
- Levine, R. A., and D. T. Campbell. 1972. *Ethnocentrism*. New York: Wiley.
- Levinson, D. J., C. N. Darrow, E. B. Klein, M. H. Levinson, and B. McKee. 1978. *The Seasons of a Man's Life*. New York: A. A. Knopf.
- Lewicki, R., and C. P. Alderfer. 1973. "The Tensions Between Research and Intervention in Intergroup Conflict." *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 9:424-49: 463-68.
- Loring, R., and T. Wells. 1972. *Breakthrough: Women into Management*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1936. *Ideology and Utopia*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- March, J. G. 1965. *Handbook of Organizations*. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
- Martin, J., and C. Siehl. 1982. "Organizational Culture and Counterculture: An Uneasy Symbiosis." Working paper. Stanford University.
- McCall, G. J., and J. L. Simmons, eds. 1969. *Issues in Participating Observation*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
- McCullom, M. 1983. "Organizational Culture: A Case Study of the BCD School." Yale School of Organization and Management Working Paper.
- McGoldrick, M., J. K. Pearce, and J. Giordano, eds. 1982. *Ethnicity and Family Therapy*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Menninger, K. 1958. *Theory of Psychoanalytic Technique*. New York: Harper Torchbooks.
- Merton, R. K. 1960. "The Ambivalences of Le Bon's *The Crowd*." In *The Crowd*, ed. G. Le Bon, pp. v-xxxix. New York: Viking.
- Miller, E. J., and A. K. Rice. 1967. *Systems of Organization*. London: Tavistock.
- Oshry, B. 1977. *Power and Position*. Boston: Power and Systems Training.
- Otterbein, K. F. 1977. *Comparative Cultural Analysis*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Paolino, T. J., and B. S. McCrady. 1978. *Marriage and Marital Therapy*. New York: Brunner/Mazel.
- Perry, H. Swick. 1982. *Psychiatrist of America*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Press.
- Pettigrew, T. P. 1981. "Extending the Stereotype Concept." In *Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behavior*, ed. D. Hamilton, pp. 303-32. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Purcell, T. V., and G. F. Cavanagh. 1972. *Blacks in the Industrial World*. New York: Free Press.
- Rice, A. K. 1963. *The Enterprise and Its Environment*. London: Tavistock.
- . 1965. *Learning for Leadership*. London: Tavistock.

- . 1969. "Individual, Group, and Intergroup Processes." *Human Relations* 22:565-84.
- Roethlisberger, F. J. 1977. *The Elusive Phenomena*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Press.
- Roethlisberger, F. J., and J. Dickinson. 1939. *Management and the Worker*. New York: Wiley.
- Sarason, S. B., K. Davidson, and B. Blatt. 1962. *The Preparation of Teachers*. New York: Wiley.
- Schein, E. H. 1983a. "Organizational Culture: A Dynamic Model." *Office of Naval Research: Technical Report*. TR-ONR-13.
- . 1983b. "The Role of the Founder in the Creation of Organizational Culture." *Office of Naval Research: Technical Report*. TR-ONR-12.
- Searles, H. J. M. D. 1955. "The Informational Value of the Supervisor's Emotional Experiences." *Psychiatry* 18:135-46.
- . 1962. "Problems of Psycho-Analytic Supervision." In *Science and Psychoanalysis*, ed. J. H. Masserman, vol. 5.
- Sherif, M. 1966. *In Common Predicament*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Sherif, M., and C. Sherif. 1953. *Groups in Harmony and Tension*. New York: Harper & Row.
- . 1969. *Social Psychology*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Singer, E. 1965. *Key Concepts in Psychotherapy*. New York: Random House.
- Smith, K. K. 1977. "An Intergroup Perspective on Individual Behavior." In *Perspectives on Behavior in Organizations*, 2d ed., ed. J. R. Hackman, E. E. Lawler, and L. W. Porter, pp. 397-407. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- . 1982. *Groups in Conflict: Prisons in Disguise*. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall-Hunt.
- Sofer, C. 1961. *The Organization from Within*. London: Tavistock.
- Sullivan, H. S. 1953. *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Sumner, W. J. 1906. *Folkways*. New York: Ginn.
- Sumner, W. G., A. G. Keller, and M. R. Davie. 1927. *The Science of Society*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tajfel, H. 1970. "Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination." *Scientific American* 223:96-102.
- Te Selle, S., ed. 1973. *The Rediscovery of Ethnicity*. New York: Harper.
- Thomas, K. 1976. "Conflict and Conflict Management." In *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, ed. M. Dunnette, pp. 889-936. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
- Trist, E. L., G. W. Higgin, H. Murray, and A. B. Pollock. 1963. *Organizational Choice*. London: Tavistock.
- Turner, J. C., and H. Giles, eds. 1981. *Intergroup Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Van Den Berge, P., ed. 1972. *Intergroup Relations*. New York: Basic Books.
- Van Steenberg, V. 1983. "Within White Group Differences on Race Relations at CTCGS." Yale School of Organization and Management Working Paper.
- Walton, R. E. 1969. *Interpersonal Peacemaking*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
- Wells, L. J. 1980. "The Group-as-a-Whole." In *Advances in Experiential Social Processes*, vol. 2, ed. C. P. Alderfer and C. L. Cooper, pp. 165-200. London: Wiley.
- Whyte, W. F. 1955a. *Money and Motivation*. New York: Harper & Row.
- . 1955b. *Street Corner Society*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.